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Justice Deferred is Justice Denied: 
We Must End Our Failed Experiment in 
Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions 
Peter R. Reilly* 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, deferred prosecution 
agreements are said to occupy an “important middle ground” between 
declining to prosecute on the one hand, and trials or guilty pleas on the 
other. A top DOJ official has declared that over the last decade, the 
agreements have become a “mainstay” of white collar criminal law 
enforcement; a prominent criminal law professor calls their increased 
use part of the “biggest change in corporate law enforcement policy in 
the last ten years.” 
However, despite deferred prosecution’s apparent rise in popularity 
among law enforcement officials, this Article sets forth the argument 
that this alternative dispute resolution vehicle makes a mockery of the 
criminal justice system by serving as a disturbing wellspring of 
unfairness, double standards, and potential abuse of power. This Article 
concludes by recommending that Congress pass legislation to halt the 
DOJ’s ability to use deferred prosecution agreements in the context of 
corporate criminal law enforcement. The Article suggests that if this 
goal cannot be realized, these agreements will continue to greatly 
compromise the pursuit of justice, consistency in the rule of law, and 
basic notions of fairness. 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Harvard Law School 
(J.D.); Georgetown University Law Center (LL.M.); Hewlett Fellow in Conflict Resolution 
and Legal Problem-Solving, Georgetown University Law Center (2002–2005). I am grateful 
for the opportunity to receive helpful feedback on an earlier version of this article from scholars 
and practitioners at several events (including a Faculty Works-in-Progress presentation at Texas 
A&M School of Law, a business breakfast at the UCLA School of Law Lowell Milken Institute 
for Business Law and Policy, and the American Association of Law Schools ADR Works-in-
Progress Conference at Southwestern School of Law). I also wish to thank Cynthia Alkon, 
Sahar Aziz, Ellen Deason, Milan Markovic, Matt Runkel, the librarians at Texas A&M School 
of Law, and the staff of the BYU Law Review, all of whom have made extremely helpful 
contributions to this project. Of course, all errors are my own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On December 12, 2012, the New York Times editorial page 
stated the following: 
It is a dark day for the rule of law. Federal and state authorities have 
chosen not to indict HSBC, the London-based bank, on charges of 
vast and prolonged money laundering, for fear that criminal 
prosecution would topple the bank and, in the process, endanger 
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the financial system. They also have not charged any top HSBC 
banker in the case, though it boggles the mind that a bank could 
launder money as HSBC did without anyone in a position of 
authority making culpable decisions.1 
Instead of indictment and prosecution, HSBC was invited to join 
what some call “Club Fed Deferred”2—a club that has a large 
corporate membership3—by entering into a deferred prosecution 
agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice wherein the bank 
would (1) pay money through forfeiture and other penalties, (2) 
work to enhance its internal controls, and (3) submit to the 
oversight of an external monitor for a period of five years.4 In 
assessing this end result, the New York Times editorial commented: 
When prosecutors choose not to prosecute to the full extent of the 
law in a case as egregious as this, the law itself is diminished. The 
deterrence that comes from the threat of criminal prosecution is 
weakened, if not lost. . . . [O]nce criminal sanctions are considered 
off limits, penalties and forfeitures become just another cost of 
doing business, a risk factor to consider on the road to profits.5 
My own reaction to the disposition of the case was more in line 
with that of Professor Jimmy Gurulé, a former enforcement official 
at the U.S. Treasury Department, who said that deferred 
prosecution in a case like HSBC makes a “mockery of the criminal 
justice system.”6 
 
 1. Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at A38. 
 2. Janet Novack, Club Fed, Deferred, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2005, 8:40 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2005/08/24/kpmg-taxes-deferred-cz_jn_0824beltway.html. 
 3. See Pub. Citizen’s Cong. Watch, Justice Deferred: The Use of Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements in the Age of ‘Too Big To Jail’, PUB. CITIZEN 7–23 (July 8, 2014), 
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/justice-deferred-too-big-to-jail-report.pdf 
(discussing how the U.S. Department of Justice has entered into deferred prosecution and/or 
non-prosecution agreements with numerous corporate entities, including Barclays Bank PLC, 
UBS, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, MetLife, the Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC 
(“RBS”), and JPMorgan Chase & Co.).  
 4. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA 
N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-
laundering-and-sanctions-violations.  
 5. Too Big to Indict, supra note 1. 
 6. Ashley Post, HSBC Might Pay $1.8 Billion Fine in Money-Laundering Settlement, 
INSIDE COUNSEL, (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/12/06/hsbc-
might-pay-18-billion-fine-in-money-laundering. Professor Gurulé suggested that law 
enforcement agencies would have a stronger impact if they indicted individuals. As Gurulé put 
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At the time, I thought the HSBC agreement would surely be the 
final low point in a two-decades-long experiment in deferring 
prosecution of alleged corporate criminal wrongdoing.7 I thought 
the case would be the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back, 
prompting swift and resolute reform, including bringing corporate 
deferred prosecutions to a well-deserved end. Since that time, 
however, deferred prosecution has been applied across the full 
spectrum of corporate conduct, generally falling into six categories of 
violations or statutes, including various types of fraud and trade 
offenses; the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; the Controlled 
Substances Act; the False Claims Act; and the Food, Drug & 
Cosmetic Act.8 
We know “that criminal charges or potential criminal charges 
against corporations are almost always resolved by a negotiated 
resolution rather than through litigation.”9 While these negotiations 
can result in guilty pleas,10 prosecutors may also choose to resolve 
the matters using Deferred Prosecution Agreements (“DPAs”) and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements (“NPAs”). While DPAs and NPAs are 
largely similar in form and substance,11 this Article will focus on 
 
it, “That would send a shockwave through the international finance services community. It 
would put the fear of God in bank officials that knowingly disregard the law.” Id. 
 7. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements 
and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1295–1300 (2013) 
(discussing DOJ’s use of a non-prosecution agreement in the Upper Big Branch mining 
disaster, a case where twenty-nine miners died and where the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration found more than 300 violations of the Mine Safety and Health Act). NPAs are 
similar in many respects to deferred prosecution agreements. See infra note 11. 
 8. 2013 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), GIBSON DUNN 19–21 (July 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2013-Mid-Year-Update-Corporate-
Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Non-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx. 
 9. Barry J. Pollack & Annie Wartanian Reisinger, Lone Wolf or the Start of a New Pack: 
Should the FCPA Guidance Represent a New Paradigm in Evaluating Corporate Criminal 
Liability Risks?, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 125 (2014).  
 10. “95% percent of all federal criminal cases (and well over 90% of cases involving 
organizational defendants) are resolved by guilty pleas.” JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL 
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (5th ed. 2012); see also Cynthia Alkon, The 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 562 (2014); Robert P. Burns, What Will We Lose if the Trial 
Vanishes?, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 575 (2011); Criminal Cases, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork
/CriminalCases.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).  
 11. One important difference is that DPAs are filed by the DOJ in federal court with a 
charging document and are subject to judicial approval. NPAs, on the other hand, are simply 
letter agreements between the DOJ and the entity subject to the agreement. Regarding NPAs, 
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DPAs, with the understanding that the observations and conclusions 
put forth herein are applicable to both. 
In a September 2012 speech before the New York City Bar 
Association, then-Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer declared 
that over the last decade DPAs have “become a mainstay of white 
collar criminal law enforcement.”12 Professor Julie O’Sullivan appears 
to concur, calling their increased use part of the “biggest change in 
corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years . . . .”13 
Moreover, federal prosecutors have come to rely heavily on such 
agreements:14 since 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice has 
entered into 283 publicly disclosed agreements.15 The U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission also uses deferred prosecution in its 
corporate enforcement regime, having entered into seven such 
agreements since 2010.16 Of the 290 agreements that the DOJ and 
the SEC have entered into since 2000, more than half (152) have 
been made since January 1, 2010. These agreements have led to 
monetary penalties totaling more than $42 billion.17 
 
there is no public filing of charges, and they are not subject to judicial review. See 
Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to 
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1 n.2 (Mar. 7, 2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/ default/files/dag/legacy/2008/03/20/morford-
useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf.  
 12. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Address at the New 
York City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012), transcript available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/ speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131.html.  
 13. Julie R. O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of Corporations” 
Charging Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Means for the Purposes of the 
Federal Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 77 (2014) (“The biggest change in 
corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years has been the plunge in criminal 
convictions of large organizations, and the DOJ’s consistent use of [deferred prosecution] 
agreements to dispose of criminal wrongdoing.”). 
 14. See Morford, supra note 11. Typically, both DPAs and NPAs require the corporate 
entities to (1) fully cooperate in the government investigation by disclosing all relevant facts; 
(2) pay a fine; (3) put into place (or bolster existing) policies and procedures to ensure 
compliance; (4) self-monitor to ensure adherence to the DPA or NPA provisions, or retain an 
external monitor that ensures adherence thereto; (5) waive any and all possible legal defenses; 
and (6) in the case of a DPA, to not deny the “Statement of Facts” appended to the 
agreement. See Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in 
Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23, 47 (2010). 
 15. 2014 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), GIBSON DUNN (July 8, 2014), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2014-Mid-Year-Update-Corporate-
Non-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.pdf. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id.; see also Uhlmann, supra note 7, at 1311.  
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According to the DOJ, DPAs are said to occupy an 
“important middle ground” between the stark, binary choice of 
either prosecution (i.e., going to trial or accepting some kind of 
plea agreement) or declination (i.e., walking away and doing 
nothing).18 Moreover, it is important that DPAs not be confused 
with plea bargaining. A plea bargain is essentially a negotiated 
deal between the government and a defendant: if the government 
agrees to reduce the charges or the severity of the sentence (or 
both), the defendant will then agree to plead guilty.19 The key 
difference is that in plea bargains, defendants ultimately accept 
guilt20 and conviction.21 With DPAs, on the other hand, there are 
neither guilty pleas nor convictions. 
Instead, DPAs are negotiated contracts22 between the 
government and targeted entities.23 In most agreements, the 
 
 18. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.200 (2014), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.h
tm#9-28.200; see also Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution 
Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1863, 1869 (2005) (“Deferred prosecution offers prosecutors an intermediate option 
between declination and plea bargaining, as deferrals exact sanctions while circumventing the 
collateral consequences of a conviction.”).  
 19. See Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to 
Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 
3607 (2013) (“Plea bargaining occurs before the start of the trial and usually takes the form of 
a series of offers and counteroffers between a prosecuting attorney and the defendant and his 
attorney. There are two broad categories of plea negotiations, each of which general entails 
concessions on the part of both the prosecution and the defendant: charge bargaining and 
sentence bargaining. In charge bargaining, the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for 
the dropping of some charges or the decrease in their severity. In sentence bargaining, the 
prosecution agrees to recommend a lesser sentence in return for the guilty plea. These 
categories are not mutually exclusive, and many plea agreements will contain elements of 
both.”) (citations omitted). 
 20. Note, however, that an Alford plea involves a “no-contest” plea where the 
defendant does not admit guilt, but nevertheless accepts a conviction. See generally Stephanos 
Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of 
Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361 (2003). 
 21. See Greenblum, supra note 18 (“A guilty plea [in a plea bargain] results in a 
conviction and collateral consequences attach no differently than if the offender had been 
convicted in a trial.”).  
 22. See Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should 
Regulation and Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 77, 80 n.16 (2006) (“DPAs are essentially contracts between the government 
and a corporate criminal in which the government agrees not to prosecute a corporation in 
return for a list of concessions.”). 
 23. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Perspectives on Corporate Criminal Liability 25 (Wash. Univ. 
in St. Louis Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-01-02, 2012), 
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company agrees: (1) to an admission of wrongdoing; (2) to 
cooperate with the government and disclose all relevant facts in 
ongoing investigations, including those in which corporate agents 
and employees might be a target; (3) to pay monetary fines and 
penalties; (4) to put into place (or bolster existing) compliance 
programs; (5) to implement a self-monitoring program in order to 
ensure adherence to various provisions of the agreement, or to 
retain an external monitor that ensures adherence thereto; (6) to 
agree to a waiver of the statute of limitations, as well as the right to 
a speedy trial; and (7) to agree to a provision stating (a) that if the 
company breaches the agreement, it will then be subject to 
prosecution, and (b) that the agreement’s statement of facts 
(including admission of guilt) will be admissible.24 In exchange for 
all this, the DOJ agrees to hold off on prosecution. In the end, if 
all elements of the DPA are successfully achieved, the initially 
accused party can move forward without fear of further legal 
consequences regarding the matter in question.25 
This Article is divided into four parts: Part I will discuss (1) the 
history of DPAs; and (2) the possibility that DPAs, by foreclosing 
opportunities for trials, jury verdicts, and appellate court decisions, 
 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1980346 (“DPAs do not 
ordinarily result in an immediate agreement to refrain from criminally prosecuting the 
corporation. Instead, they effectively place the corporation under government supervision for a 
specified period of time and defer the decision whether to actively pursue criminal charges 
pending a determination whether the corporation will successfully fulfill the terms and 
conditions of the agreement. . . . Although [DPAs] almost invariably involve exacting some 
concession from the corporation such as payment of a fine or restitution, these exactions are a 
product of ad hoc decisions by prosecutors about the most effective and efficient means to 
resolve a case through negotiated agreement rather than through formal punishment imposed 
by a court upon conviction.”). 
 24. See O’Sullivan, supra note 13, at 53. Note that many agreements go beyond these 
more basic provisions. See F. Joseph Warin & Peter E. Jaffe, Commentary, The Deferred-
Prosecution Jigsaw Puzzle: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 19 ANDREWS WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
REP., Sept. 2005, at 3, 5 (suggesting that “[o]ne of the most appealing aspects [of deferred 
prosecution agreements] is the ability to tailor each one according to the specific needs of the 
respective parties, with both sides bargaining for what they hold most dear”). 
 25. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 
87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 645–47 (2002). Professor Laufer suggests that law enforcement within 
the corporate context oftentimes translates into “a brand of negotiated compliance” where 
“reciprocal promises” are made, and where companies cooperate and accept responsibility “in 
exchange for mitigation, exculpation, or absolution.” The professor uses language of 
negotiation theory as he refers to this “bargained-for exchange” or “trading of favors[] with an 
arsenal of sanctions in the background.” Id.  
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might interfere with the important process of clarifying the 
boundaries of the law. 
Part II will discuss (1) the collateral consequences 
surrounding traditional criminal conviction, including suspension, 
debarment, and exclusion; (2) to what extent prosecutors should, 
in making charging and other decisions, anticipate and/or 
attempt to prevent those collateral consequences; and (3) a brief 
history of respondeat superior liability and why companies tend to 
favor DPAs over going to trial. 
Part III will discuss (1) whether prosecutors have too much 
power, leverage, and control in deciding whether, when, and how 
DPAs will be used to resolve a given matter; (2) the issue of a 
“revolving door” between criminal enforcement agencies and private 
law practice, and its possible impact on prosecutorial charging 
decisions; and (3) the extent to which prosecutors are (a) deciding to 
pursue companies instead of individuals, (b) are focusing on 
reforming corporate “culture” instead of punishing misbehavior, and 
(c) are using DPAs to extract a “pound of flesh” from an alleged 
wrongdoer in instances where such action might not be warranted. 
Part IV concludes with the recommendation that Congress 
should pass legislation to halt the DOJ’s ability to use DPAs in the 
context of corporate criminal law enforcement. 
I. THE RISE OF DPAS 
A. DPAs: From 1914 to the Present 
DPAs emerged in the early 1900s as a way to address non-serious 
misdemeanor charges, such as retail theft, especially when committed 
by juveniles or first-time offenders.26 As one commentator notes, 
their use “is rooted in small measures to protect vulnerable persons 
in society.”27 The Chicago Boys’ Court implemented deferred 
prosecution in 1914 in the hope that juvenile offenders would not 
be labeled and stigmatized as “criminals,”28 and the Judicial 
Conference formally endorsed the use of DPAs beginning in 1947.29 
 
 26. Kristie Xian, Note, The Price of Justice: Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the Context 
of Iranian Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 631, 642–43 (2014). 
 27. Id. at 642.  
 28. Greenblum, supra note 18, at 1866. 
 29. Center for Health and Justice at TASC, No Entry: A National Survey of Criminal 
Justice Diversion Programs and Initiatives 16 (Dec. 2013). 
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It was common to combine deferred prosecution with community-
based counseling, training, and job-placement programs to further 
assist the offender and help him or her avoid a future life of crime.30 
In 1976, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration issued 
a grant to the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies 
(NAPSA) in order to develop national standards for programs that 
administer pretrial diversion programs.31 The following year, the 
DOJ promulgated standards for deferral of prosecution, citing three 
principal objectives: “[(1)] To prevent future criminal activity among 
certain offenders by diverting them from traditional processing into 
community supervision and services; [(2)] To save prosecutive and 
judicial resources for concentration on major cases; and [(3)] To 
provide, where appropriate, a vehicle for restitution to communities 
and victims of crime.”32 
In analyzing the first two of these three objectives, a plain 
reading would suggest that the DOJ designed the deferrals for 
application to individuals rather than organizations or entities (see 
objective (1)), and for application to small or medium-sized cases 
rather than “major” cases (see objective (2)). Nevertheless, it is clear 
that, over time, the DOJ decided to utilize the agreements to resolve 
possible criminal misconduct involving corporate and other business 
entities (i.e., something other than “individuals”), and matters that 
could be considered “major” cases, as will be discussed below. 
One of the earliest uses of DPAs in the corporate context 
occurred in 1994 when Mary Jo White, then the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, entered into a DPA 
 
 30.  Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 827 (1974) 
(“Pretrial diversion is a formalized procedure authorized by legislation, court rule, or, most 
commonly, by informal prosecutorial consent, whereby persons who are accused of certain 
criminal offenses and meet preestablished criteria have their prosecution suspended for a three 
month to one year period and are placed in a community-based rehabilitation program. The 
rehabilitation program may include counseling, training, and job placement. If conditions of 
the diversion referral are satisfied, the prosecution may be nolle prossed or the case dismissed; 
if not, the accused is returned for normal criminal processing.”). 
 31. Center for Health and Justice at TASC,  supra note 29. 
 32. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 18, § 9-22.010 (emphasis added); see also 
Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 6.02A (Discussion Draft No. 4 2012) (stating that the 
“primary purposes of deferred prosecution are to facilitate the offender’s rehabilitation and 
reintegration into the law-abiding community and the restoration of crime victims and 
communities, while avoiding the stigma and collateral consequences associated with criminal 
charges and convictions”). 
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with Prudential Securities.33 While that agreement helped blaze a 
trail for other prosecutors to negotiate pretrial diversion agreements, 
the DOJ initially used the agreements quite sparingly: from 2000 
through 2004, the DOJ entered into an average of approximately 
four agreements per year.34 Starting in 2005, however, the number of 
agreements increased to an average of twenty-eight agreements per 
year,35 with peak years in 2007 (with thirty-nine filings), 2010 (with 
thirty-nine filings), and 2012 (with thirty-seven filings).36 
This dramatic increase is likely due to the many positive effects of 
resolving matters through a DPA, including (1) allowing companies 
to avoid the stigma (and other negative consequences) that might 
flow from a criminal indictment or trial;37 (2) minimizing the 
likelihood of collateral damage to innocent third parties (such as job 
losses resulting from company closures, etc.);38 (3) enabling the 
collection of large fines, thereby leading to punishment for the 
alleged wrongdoer and restitution for victims;39 (4) mandating 
specific reforms within the company and controlling how future 
business is conducted;40 and (5) monitoring company behavior to 
ensure conformity with the terms of the agreement.41 Indeed, some 
commentators suggest that prosecutors can achieve through DPAs, 
“all that they could win at trial . . . without the significant 
expenditure of time and resources.”42 
 
 33. Greenblum, supra note 18, at 1873. 
 34. 2013 Year-End Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), GIBSON DUNN 1 (Jan. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Year-End-Update-Corporate-
Non-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.pdf. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 2014 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), GIBSON DUNN 2 chart 1 (July 8, 2014), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2014-Mid-Year-Update-Corporate-
Non-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.pdf; see also Uhlmann, 
supra note 7, at 1311.  
 37. See Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and the Impact 
on the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1314 (2014). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1315. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, Prosecution Deferred: Exploring the 
Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 
1483 (2007). 
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Despite these advantages of DPAs, however, there are certain 
drawbacks to both the agreements themselves and to the way in 
which they are negotiated. U.S. District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff, 
who has handled numerous high-profile cases that have been 
resolved through the use of deferred prosecution, provides an 
accurate (and, to some, disturbing) picture of how the DPA 
negotiation process moves forward, from beginning to end, from the 
vantage point of the government. Acording to Judge Rakoff, once 
you—you being the federal government—come to believe that 
misbehavior may have occurred within a given company, counsel to 
that company then 
responds by assuring you that the company wants to cooperate 
and do the right thing, and to that end the company has hired a 
former Assistant U.S. Attorney, now a partner at a respected law 
firm, to do an internal investigation. The company’s counsel asks 
you to defer your investigation until the company’s own internal 
investigation is completed, on the condition that the company 
will share its results with you. In order to save time and resources, 
you agree. Six months later the company’s counsel returns, with a 
detailed report showing that mistakes were made but that the 
company is now intent on correcting them. You and the company 
then agree that the company will enter into a deferred 
prosecution agreement that couples some immediate fines with 
the imposition of expensive but internal prophylactic measures. 
For all practical purposes the case is now over. You are happy 
because you believe that you have helped prevent future crimes; 
the company is happy because it has avoided a devastating 
indictment; and perhaps the happiest of all are the executives, or 
former executives, who actually committed the underlying 
misconduct, for they are left untouched.43 
The judge concludes that such a process “is not the best way to 
proceed” and states that “the future deterrent value of successfully 
prosecuting individuals far outweighs the prophylactic benefits of 
imposing internal compliance measures that are often little more 
than window-dressing.”44 I strongly agree; indeed, addressing 
 
 43. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Have No High Level Executives Been Prosecuted In Connection 
With The Financial Crisis?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/11/15/why-have-no-high-level-executives-been-
prosecuted-in-connection-with-the-financial-crisis; see generally Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan 
Sack, The ‘Civil-izing’ of White-Collar Criminal Enforcement, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2013, at 3. 
 44. Rakoff, supra note 43. 
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possible corporate wrongdoing through DPAs has serious negative 
implications for justice and fairness, many of which will be described 
and analyzed in this article. My end goal is to convince readers that 
DPAs—as well as the process through which they are negotiated and 
implemented—make a mockery of the criminal justice system, and it 
is therefore time to end our failed experiment in using them in the 
context of corporate criminal wrongdoing. 
B. Do DPAs Short Circuit the Process of Clarifying the Boundaries of 
the Law? 
The jurisprudence of a given area of law is developed primarily 
through litigation—meaning trials, jury verdicts, and appellate court 
decisions.  Importantly, litigated cases  
provide judicial opinions regarding what conduct violates the 
criminal laws and what does not. Thus, in addition to the criminal 
statutes themselves, corporations and individuals . . . would have 
guidance available to them in the form of judicial opinions 
providing elaboration as to what specific fact patterns constituted 
criminal behavior and, likewise, what fact patterns did not.45  
Obviously, when cases are resolved through DPAs, there is no 
litigation, nor instructive legal precedent resulting therefrom.46 As 
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow warns us: “When an authoritative 
rule is necessary, . . . the courts must adjudicate and provide clear 
guidance for all . . . .”47 
While examining the text of previous DPAs can provide 
companies with some guidance in clarifying the boundaries of 
permissible legal conduct, such agreements do not provide binding 
judicial precedent that can be legally relied upon by companies 
facing similar circumstances.48 Nevertheless, when the DOJ 
 
 45. Pollack & Reisinger, supra note 9, at 123–24. 
 46. One commentator suggests the DOJ has an incentive to use deferred prosecution 
agreements in place of formal prosecution because, among other reasons, doing so 
“strategically keep[s] the law underdeveloped in order to place more pressure on corporations.” 
Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J. L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 137, 139 n.22 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 47. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Essay, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the 
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 500 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 48. In addition to reviewing deferred prosecution agreements, interested parties can 
glean guidance in different areas of the law from sources such as: (1) opinion procedure 
releases in the area of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; (2) business review procedures 
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announces a deferred prosecution, the agency is thereby setting forth 
guidance to the general public on how it might approach similar 
cases in the future.  If a company enters into a DPA based on a 
particular set of facts, other individuals and companies will thereafter 
know that the particular fact pattern “will be deemed by the DOJ to 
cross the line of what is criminal.”49 Of course, because the DPA fails 
to provide any kind of binding judicial precedent, “the DOJ  is 
under no obligation to treat the same conduct by different 
corporations with any consistency, increasing the challenges of 
corporate compliance and risk reduction.”50 
 
(“BRP”) in the antitrust context; and (3) advisory opinions in dealing with Medicare, 
Medicaid, and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). All of 
these forms of guidance are similar to deferred prosecution agreements in that, while they can 
be helpful and instructive, they do not have any precedential value. See Pollack & Reisinger, 
supra note 9, at 144–47. 
 49. Id. at 126, 135 (discussing the lack of judicial opinions in the context of Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act enforcement, the authors state, “Due to the limited number of litigated 
FCPA cases, the relatively small number of opinion procedure releases, and the lack of 
information regarding enforcement policies from the Layperson’s Guide, FCPA corporate 
settlement documents became the true bread and butter of de facto agency ‘jurisprudence’ 
guiding corporate conduct”). 
 50. Id. at 127. In addition, the language set forth in these DPAs fails to give insight 
regarding actions that do not cross the line into criminal activity. As Pollack and Reisinger put it: 
Assume, for example, that the DOJ investigates corporation A for six different 
potential criminal violations. Or, more likely in the modern world described above, a 
corporation is so concerned about the possibility of criminal prosecution, it 
voluntarily discloses to the DOJ six potential criminal violations. The company takes 
the position that of these six arguable violations, three are, in fact, violations of the 
law and three are not. The DOJ takes the position that five of the six constitute 
criminal violations. Ultimately, as a product of negotiation, the DOJ agrees that the 
fifth fact pattern did not cross the line and the corporation agrees that the fourth 
fact pattern did. The DOJ and corporation A then enter into a deferred prosecution 
agreement. Corporation A admits that it engaged in four sets of behavior that were 
criminal, pays a large monetary penalty and agrees to increase its compliance 
measures. The public reads this resolution and knows of four fact patterns that the 
DOJ believes cross the line. The public does not learn of the fifth and sixth fact 
patterns that the DOJ agreed, for the purposes of the negotiation, did not cross the 
line. Had the cases been litigated, the public would have learned that the DOJ 
charged the fifth fact pattern, but that this charge was dismissed by the court as 
failing to state an offense or that corporation A was acquitted of this charge and 
therefore that that fact pattern is not illegal, or, at a minimum, not likely to be 
prosecuted again.  
Id. at 126; see also F. Joseph Warin & Peter E. Jaffe, Rolling the Dice in Corporate Fraud 
Prosecutions, LITIG., Spring 2007, at 12, 15 (concluding “there is no rhyme or reason to the DOJ’s 
application of [DPAs and NPAs] to corporate entities”); Alyssa Ladd, Comment, The Catch-22 of 
Corporate Cooperation in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 947, 960 
(2014) (pointing out that the DOJ has “no concrete guidelines” for entering DPAs). 
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II. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR: 
FORCES DRIVING DECISION MAKERS TO OPT FOR DPAS 
A. Collateral Consequences: Suspension, Debarment, and Exclusion 
Scholars John Gallo and Daniel Greenfield argue that “[t]he 
characteristics of corporate criminal law result in an unusual state of 
affairs: neither a corporation nor a federal prosecutor has an 
incentive to take a corporate criminal case to trial.”51 
These authors suggest that, “[f]rom the corporation’s 
perspective, respondeat superior may render remote the odds of a 
not-guilty verdict.”52 And “[f]rom the prosecutor’s perspective, 
debarment and exclusion upon conviction risk substantial injury to 
innocent third parties—i.e., employees, stockholders, and 
consumers—and to the national economy as a whole.”53 They 
conclude that it is “no mystery” why the usage of DPAs has 
“exploded” in the last two decades: “[B]oth corporations and the 
government are virtually required to rely upon them in order to 
circumvent the unfairness created by the combination of respondeat 
superior liability and the collateral consequences of a conviction, 
including disbarment and exclusion.”54 
If a corporation decides to go to trial and loses, it might face 
debarment or exclusion. Debarment and exclusion occur in different 
ways: First, a corporation can be debarred at the discretion of a 
federal agency pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulations.55 
Sometimes called an “administrative debarment,”56 this kind of 
debarment is carried out “to protect the Government’s interest” by 
ensuring that federal agencies conduct business only with companies 
 
 51. John N. Gallo & Daniel M. Greenfield, The Corporate Criminal Defendant’s Illusory Right 
to Trial: A Proposal for Reform, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 525, 536 (2014). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 537; see also Pollack & Reisinger, supra note 9 (“[A]s reluctant as the DOJ has 
become post-Arthur Andersen to prosecute criminal charges against corporations, corporations 
have become even more reluctant to defend against such charges. The result is that criminal 
charges or potential criminal charges against corporations are almost always resolved by a 
negotiated resolution rather than through litigation.”). 
 55. 48 C.F.R. § 99.402 (2013). 
 56.  Rena Steinzor & Anne Havermann, Too Big to Obey: Why BP Should Be Debarred, 36 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 81, 97 (2011) (discussing how administrative 
debarments and suspensions “are meant to protect the public interest, not to punish”). 
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that are “responsible.”57 Second, a company might face a “statutory 
debarment,” wherein a particular statute mandates that a convicted 
corporation be debarred. Consider, for example, the Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 7606 (a), which states: 
 No federal agency may enter into any contract with any person 
who is convicted of any offense under section 7413(c) of this title 
for the procurement of goods, materials, and services to perform 
such contract at any facility at which the violation which gave rise 
to such conviction occurred if such facility is owned, leased, or 
supervised by such person.58 
Clearly, if a company relies on government contracts as a source 
of projects and profits, such statutory debarment could dramatically 
impact its bottom line, if not put it out of business altogether.59 
Finally, a company might be excluded from participating in 
certain federal programs. Consider, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7, dealing with exclusion from participation in Medicare and other 
health programs, where there is “[m]andatory exclusion” (i.e., “The 
Secretary shall exclude the following individuals and entities from 
participation . . . .”) for serious transgressions such as patient abuse, 
felony health care fraud, and felony controlled substance convictions, 
but merely “[p]ermissive exclusion” (i.e., “The Secretary may 
exclude the following individuals and entities from 
participation . . . .”) for less serious transgressions, including 
misdemeanor health care fraud, obstruction of an investigation or 
audit, or misdemeanor-controlled substance conviction.60 
Debarment and exclusion can be devastating for a company. 
With an estimated $460 billion spent in fiscal year 2013 alone,61 the 
United States government is the world’s largest purchaser of goods 
and services.62 For companies that depend heavily on contracts with 
 
 57. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(a), (b) (2013). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (2012). 
 59. Joel Androphy et al., The Intersection of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: What All Practitioners, Whistleblowers, Defendants, and Corporations Need to Know, 
ADVOC., Summer 2012  at 19, 23 (“All the disadvantages of plea agreements, DPAs, and NPAs pale 
in comparison to debarment from participation in . . . government programs.”). 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (emphasis added) (2012). 
 61. Danielle Ivory, Federal Contracts Plunge, Squeezing Private Companies, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 16, 2014, at B1.  
 62. Steinzor & Havermann, supra note 56, at 111. 
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the federal government, exclusion and debarment can amount to a 
corporate “death penalty.”63 
But is it reasonable for criminal convictions to result in automatic 
(and oftentimes quite large) civil sanctions? Moreover, does 
debarment and similar sanctions have to be so rigid and one-size-fits-
all? Elizabeth Ainslie, an experienced corporate compliance and 
criminal defense litigator, suggests that laws imposing “mandatory, 
automatic, and drastic civil sanctions in the wake of criminal 
convictions are unnecessarily harsh and rigid.”64 According to 
Ainslie, such laws also give federal prosecutors tremendous power 
over companies, particularly those that are smaller in scale within 
their respective industry, or that are not sole-source producers of 
crucial goods or services.65 She opines: 
This regime gives government, and especially the federal 
government, vast and irrationally shaped areas of power. . . . 
Defendant corporations . . . often feel forced to pay exceedingly 
large settlements on the civil side, and to plead guilty to a carefully 
orchestrated charge on the criminal side, simply to avoid “betting 
the company” in a criminal trial, the outcome of which might mean 
automatic exclusion from a federal program that provides a 
significant portion of the company’s livelihood. Moreover, the 
smaller a portion of the relevant market the defendant occupies, 
the disproportionately smaller its bargaining power with the 
government. A major aircraft manufacturer, or even a small 
pharmaceutical company which is the sole source of an important 
drug, is much less susceptible to a disastrous criminal outcome than 
is its much smaller or more generic competitor.66 
All of this begs the question, to what extent might we revisit 
the rules and processes governing sanctions such as automatic 
debarment? Perhaps there could be multi-layered processes 
 
 63. See Pollack & Reisinger, supra note 9 (“Conviction may lead to debarment, the 
death penalty for a company that relies on government contracts, or exclusion, the death 
penalty for a health care provider who receives payments from Medicare or Medicaid.”). 
 64. Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen 
Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 110, 118 (2006) (“This coupling is most frequently 
found in the government contracts arena, where Congress has in general decreed that those 
who are convicted of defrauding the government will automatically be debarred from contracts 
with the government. This may appear to be a rational decree at first blush, but . . . in practice 
it leads to vast dislocations of power as between the Department of Justice and businesses that 
deal with the government . . . .”). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 118. 
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regarding how such decisions are made and implemented, with 
opportunities for more discretion on the part of regulators, and 
opportunities for businesses to appeal civil sanctions before they 
go into effect.67 
B. Should Prosecutors Attempt to Anticipate and Prevent Collateral 
Consequences? 
There is a valid regulatory interest in debarring and de-licensing 
companies for serious corporate transgressions: it ensures that the 
federal government does business only with “responsible” business 
partners.68 But, unfortunately, it is not only the irresponsible business 
partners that are impacted when a company is debarred.  Numerous 
other parties face collateral consequences, including employees, 
stockholders, and, of course, customers who rely on the products 
and services produced or provided by those businesses.   Consider, 
for example, a drug and medical device company that engages in 
misconduct, resulting in the company’s disbarment. When the 
company can no longer receive reimbursements from Medicare or 
Medicaid, that company’s customers will be forced to find the 
lifesaving and life-sustaining drugs and devices elsewhere. But what if 
no other company produces the drugs or devices?  Or what if other 
companies step in to fill the market void but cannot ramp up 
production quickly enough to meet consumer demand? Could it be 
considered immoral or unconscionable to make completely innocent 
consumers suffer such collateral consequences—consequences that 
could even result in death? 
I argue that it should not be the responsibility of federal 
prosecutors to anticipate and prevent these kinds of consequences 
when carrying out their duty of upholding the law and applying it 
 
 67. O’Sullivan, supra note 13, at 32 (“Prosecutors . . . don’t want to be 
responsible, for example, for the debarment from Medicare or Medicaid of companies 
that offer life-saving drugs or medical devices. But the point is that the prosecutors are 
not responsible: the rules governing the application of these collateral consequences are 
the problem. In short, if collateral consequences create real concerns, they should be 
addressed on their own terms by permitting regulators additional discretion in their 
administration or otherwise altering the rules.”). 
 68. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.103 (“Purchases shall be made from, and contracts shall be 
awarded to, responsible prospective contractors only.”). See also § 9.104-1 (listing factors 
that define a responsible contractor); § 9.402 (a)–(b). See generally, Jessica Tillipman, 
Suspension and Debarment: The Congressional War on Contractors, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 235 (2013).  
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equally and fairly. Rather, I believe that such problems should be 
addressed by the legislators who create the rules and laws 
surrounding this issue, or by the regulators who work to implement 
those rules and laws. Perhaps regulators could be given more 
discretion to forego debarring or de-licensing companies that have 
committed bad acts.69 Or perhaps the current laws, rules, and 
policies setting forth the various terms of suspension, debarment, 
and/or de-licensing (e.g., the length and severity of the actions and 
penalties) need to be reassessed and possibly changed by 
lawmakers.70 
When we rely on prosecutors to attempt to prevent these kinds 
of consequences, a double standard or “dual system of justice” is 
thereby created in terms of which companies will be spared 
prosecution.71 Specifically, it is only for those select companies that 
can potentially cause serious collateral damage to innocent third 
parties (e.g., large companies with great numbers of employees that 
could potentially be laid off, large banks that are considered pivotal 
to the national or international economy, or companies that are the 
sole or nearly sole providers of vital services or products like life-
saving drugs or devices) that the DOJ will place a thumb on the 
scale in favor of deferred prosecution rather than indictment. A 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study discussed the 
importance of this factor to prosecutors as they made 
charging decisions: 
[P]rosecutors explained . . . that the potential harm that 
prosecution and conviction of health care companies can have on 
innocent third parties may be a key factor in their decision on 
entering into a DPA or NPA with these kinds of companies. 
Federal law provides for health care companies convicted of certain 
crimes to be debarred from—or no longer eligible to participate 
 
 69. Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006 
(“[T]eams of state and federal regulators are now duty-bound to suspend the licenses and 
permits under which the corporation does business. Thus, the corporation that has strong 
protections against false convictions—proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of 
the crime, the ability to examine evidence or cross-examine witnesses—is helpless to protect 
itself.”) (Emphasis added).  
 70. O’Sullivan, supra note 13, at 32. 
 71. See Xian, supra note 26, at 661 (“The continued use of deferred prosecution in the 
corporate context creates a dual system of justice. . . . If you are an individual or small business 
owner, you will be prosecuted . . . . However, if you are a bank official of a large, international 
bank, you will be granted prosecutorial leeway and avoid criminal sanctions altogether.”). 
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in—federal health care programs. Prosecutors in one office said 
that they chose to enter into DPAs and an NPA simultaneously 
with five orthopedic device companies that provided kickbacks to 
physicians because, combined, these companies comprised the vast 
majority of the market for hip and knee replacements; therefore, 
conviction and debarment of these companies would have severely 
limited doctor and patient access to replacement hips and knees.72 
And yet not all companies get this kind of treatment. Consider 
the case of G&A Check Cashing, a small store in Los Angeles. In the 
fall of 2012 (just prior to the HSBC settlement discussed at the 
beginning of this article), the DOJ obtained guilty pleas from G&A 
Check Cashing and two of its senior officers. G&A and its officers 
were charged with laundering eight million dollars—a miniscule 
amount compared to the billions of dollars allegedly laundered by 
HSBC. Following their guilty pleas, both G&A officers were sent to 
prison.73 As one scholar notes, “[t]he dramatically different 
treatment of HSBC and G&A and their respective senior officers can 
hardly be squared with any meaningful concept of ‘equal justice 
under the law.’”74 
Professor O’Sullivan concludes that the only advantage to using 
DPAs (instead of relying upon criminal indictment and a possible 
conviction) is that deferring prosecution “permit[s] the government 
to avoid blame for whatever collateral consequences may flow from a 
corporate guilty plea—be it debarment from government 
contracting, the de-licensing of the firm, or losses in revenue, jobs, 
or shareholder value.”75 O’Sullivan states that such a “singular focus 
 
 72. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-636T, CORPORATE CRIME: 
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON DOJ’S USE AND OVERSIGHT OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION 
AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 9 (2009) (footnote omitted). 
 73. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Los Angeles Check Cashing Store, Head 
Manager and Compliance Officer Sentenced for Violating Anti-money Laundering Laws (Jan. 
14. 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/2013/008.html (stating that G&A 
Check Cashing paid a one million dollar fine, a manager was sentenced to five years, and the 
compliance officer was sentenced to eight months). 
 74. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to 
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1375 (2013). 
 75. O’Sullivan, supra note 13, at 77. See also Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, 
Symposium: Corporate, Criminality: Legal, Ethical, and Managerial Implication: The Challenge 
of Cooperation: Prosecution Deferred: Exploring the Unintended Consequences and Future of 
Corporate Cooperation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1483 (2007) (suggesting that prosecutors 
seek DPAs because, among other reasons, the prosecutors “escape the criticism that would 
likely flow from the destruction of the corporate entity.”). 
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on collateral consequences” undermines the “fair and even-handed 
administration of criminal justice.”76 
Moreover, this strong focus on collateral consequences might be 
misplaced altogether, as scholars and experts now begin to question 
the degree to which a company is truly harmed from the collateral 
consequences that flow from indictment and conviction. In other 
words, is the sky really falling? Do companies truly have legitimate 
and compelling reasons to be afraid of indictment, or are their fears 
somehow overblown? Our knowledge surrounding this question 
seems to be quickly increasing. In 2012, then Assistant Attorney 
General Lanny Breuer stated: 
We are frequently on the receiving end of presentations from 
defense counsel, CEOs, and economists who argue that the 
collateral consequences of an indictment would be devastating for 
their client. . . . I personally feel that it’s my duty to consider 
whether individual employees with no responsibility for, or 
knowledge of, misconduct committed by others in the same 
company are going to lose their livelihood if we indict the 
corporation. In large multi-national companies, the jobs of tens of 
thousands of employees can be at stake. And, in some cases, the 
health of an industry or the markets are a real factor. Those are the 
kinds of considerations in white collar crime cases that literally keep 
me up at night, and which must play a role in 
responsible enforcement.77  
Less than a year later, in 2013, Gabriel Markoff published an 
article entitled Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death 
Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First 
Century,78 in which he challenged prevailing notions regarding the 
collateral consequences of convicting corporate entities. Using a 
database of organizational convictions, Markoff comes to the 
arguably surprising conclusion that, in the years 2001 to 2010, no 
publicly traded company failed due to a conviction,79 and thus “the 
 
 76. O’Sullivan, supra note 13, at 77. 
 77. Breuer, supra note 12. 
 78.  Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: 
Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 802 (2013). 
 79. Id. But see Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, The Debate About Deferred and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements, 248 N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 2012, at 3 (“While the reality is that 
corporations may not face the type of collateral consequences suffered by Arthur Andersen, 
there is no question that fighting criminal charges can have a tremendous impact on a 
corporation’s reputation and pocketbook.”). 
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risk of driving companies out of business through prosecutions has 
been radically exaggerated.”80 
I will leave it to historians and political scientists to help 
determine why the DOJ seemed to turn a corner in its thinking on 
this matter, but it is interesting to see the very different tone and 
message delivered in a speech in early 2014, just months after the 
publishing of Markoff’s article, by Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet 
Bharara, who stated: 
What I have found typically is that, in reality, as we had suspected, 
the sky does not fall . . . And so, this repeated Chicken Little 
routine, I will tell you, begins to wear thin. And the result is that 
we view with more and more skepticism and with more and more 
doubt all the breathless claims of catastrophic consequences made 
by companies both large and small.81 
A cynic (or realist?) might contend, then, that corporations are 
well aware that they could successfully survive indictment and even 
conviction. Indeed, Archer Daniels Midland, Chevron, Exxon, 
General Electric, Georgia Pacific, Hoffman LaRoche, Pfizer, and 
Tyson are just a few of many U.S. companies that have been 
convicted of serious violations, and yet still flourish.82 It could be 
argued, however, that it is nevertheless strategically wise for a 
company to do or say whatever has to be done or said—including 
making “breathless claims of catastrophic consequences”—in order  
to obtain a DPA.83  
 
 80. Markoff, supra note 78. 
 81. Halah Touryalai, This Preet Bharara Speech Should Scare All Big Banks, Especially 
Citi, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2014, 1:41 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2014/04/03/this-preet-bharara-speech-
should-scare-all-big-banks-especially-citi/. See also Mark Gongloff, Eric Holder: Actually, I 
Meant to Say No Banks are Too Big to Jail, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2013, 3:31 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/15/eric-holder-too-big-to-jail_n_3280694.html 
(describing testimony of Attorney General Holder at a congressional hearing; specifically, in 
responding to the question of whether some banks were “too big to jail,” Mr. Holder stated: 
“Let me be very, very, very clear. Banks are not too big to jail. If we find a bank or a financial 
institution that has done something wrong, . . . those cases will be brought”). 
 82. See Russell Mokhiber, Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non 
Prosecution Agreements, CORP. CRIME REP. (2005) (discussing numerous major U.S. 
companies that survived and thrived after having been convicted of serious crimes). See also 
Randall D. Eliason, We Need to Indict Them: Deferred Prosecution Agreements Won’t Deter 
Enough Corporate Crime, 31 LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at 54. 
 83. But see Joseph G. Block & David L. Feinberg, Look Before You Leap—DPAs, NPAs, 
and the Environmental Criminal Case, 9 ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT & CRIMES COMMITTEE 
NEWSL., Apr. 2008, at 5, 7 (noting that while a deferred prosecution agreement “saves the 
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C. Respondeat Superior: Why Companies Avoid Trial and Seek Out DPAs 
If a company is facing potential criminal liability, might it make 
more sense to accept a DPA than to risk going to trial in the matter?  
The standard for proving “[c]orporate criminal liability developed as 
courts struggled to overcome the problem of assigning criminal 
blame to fictional entities in a legal system based on the moral 
accountability of individuals.”84 In 1909, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company v. 
United States, a case in which a railroad company was appealing its 
conviction based on the conduct of an employee who violated 
federal law while acting within the scope of his employment.85 
In holding the company responsible, the Court stated: “[W]e see 
no good reason why corporations may not be held responsible for 
and charged with the knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting 
within the authority conferred upon them. If it were not so, many 
offenses might go unpunished. . . .”86 The Court noted that “the 
great majority of business transactions in modern times are 
conducted through [corporations, and to] give them immunity from 
all punishment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a 
corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take away the 
only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and 
correcting the abuses aimed at.”87 
The Court then affirmed the conviction based on the tort 
doctrine of respondeat superior liability: 
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step 
further in holding that the act of an agent, while exercising the 
authority delegated to him . . . may be controlled, in the interest of 
public policy, by imputing his acts to his employer and imposing 
penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting . . . .88 
Professors Gallo and Greenfield suggest that the doctrine of 
respondeat superior makes a quick and near-certain link between the 
 
client from mandatory statutory debarment, . . . it may not protect against federal discretionary 
debarment or suspension”). 
 84. Michael Viano & Jenny R. Arnold, Corporate Criminal Liability, 43 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 311, 312 (2006). 
 85. New York Central v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 490–92 (1909). 
 86. Id. at 494–95. 
 87. Id. at 495–96. 
 88. Id. at 494. 
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behavior of the agent and the corporation, stating, “Once there is 
evidence that an employee engaged in criminal activity on the job, 
the criminal case against the company may be ‘virtually 
bulletproof.’”89 Indeed, according to Gallo and Greenfield, the 
doctrine of respondeat superior can expose the corporate defendant 
to criminal liability even where: 
(a) the criminal behavior was perpetrated by a low-level, rogue 
employee; 
(b) the transgression took place without the knowledge of 
upper-level management; 
(c) the employee was explicitly instructed by the corporation 
not to engage in the conduct; 
(d) the conduct directly violated established company policy; 
(e) the conduct failed to benefit the company; 
(f) the company had in place a robust compliance program at 
the time the transgression occurred; and 
(g) the conduct was exposed by the compliance program.90 
Professor O’Sullivan sums up the situation thusly: “the 
respondeat superior standard has been expanded through common 
law adjudication to the point where it is less a standard than a 
guarantor of liability.”91 Such a situation, of course, can be 
problematic for any company wishing to contest a criminal matter 
through litigation, and some practitioners in this area of law argue 
 
 89. Gallo & Greenfield, supra note 51, at 529 (citing Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry 
Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate 
Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 76 (2007)). 
 90. Id. (citing Lucian E. Dervan, Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Liability: The DOJ’s 
Internal Moral Culpability Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 7 
(2011); Bharara, supra note 89). 
 91. O’Sullivan, supra note 13, at 33 (emphasis added). See id. at 33–34 (“[I]ntent may 
be imputed to the corporation from a person distinct from the individual who committed the 
actus reus of the crime . . . . Prosecutors need not identify the actual wrongdoer, as long as it 
can be inferred that some person ‘did it’ within the organization. Inconsistent verdicts are 
tolerated, under which corporations are convicted when all conceivable culpable agents have 
been acquitted. And courts accept a ‘collective knowledge’ theory, under which no one person 
knew all the facts demanded by statute, and the required knowledge can be pieced together 
from what various people within the corporation knew . . . . [C]orporations can be held liable 
even if they had in place good faith and generally effective (but not necessarily foolproof) 
compliance systems designed to prevent and punish such wrong-doing.”) (citations omitted). 
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that the current doctrine is flawed. One such critic is criminal 
defense litigator Elizabeth Ainslie, who argues: 
There is . . . no reason why the doctrine of respondeat superior 
should be imported in its totality into the criminal law. The 
purpose of the doctrine on the civil side of the law is fairly clear: if 
an employee injures a third party in the course of his duties on 
behalf of an employer, that injured party should be able to obtain 
economic compensation from the employer on whose behalf the 
economic conduct occurred. On the criminal side, however, it 
makes absolutely no sense to enable a jury to convict an entire 
organization on the basis of conduct of a lower-level employee, nor 
does it make sense to convict an organization on the basis of a 
rogue employee’s conduct where that conduct was contrary to a 
genuine corporate policy.92 
Ainslie believes that one important fix could be for the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to adopt a federal jury instruction 
based on the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code 
(“MPC”) § 2.07(1)(c),93 which states: “[T]he commission of the 
offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or 
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high 
managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation within the 
scope of his office or employment.”94 
 
 92. Ainslie, supra note 64, at 120. 
 93. Id. at 119–120, 123 (pointing out that the law of the Fifth Circuit, where the 
Arthur Andersen firm was prosecuted, essentially incorporated the rules of respondeat superior 
from civil cases into criminal cases without significant modification. Moreover, the jury 
instruction given by the judge in the Andersen case was derived from the federal common law, 
rather than from a statute. Thus, according to Ainslie, the judge in the case instructed the jury 
that “(1) Andersen was legally bound by the acts and statements of its agents made within the 
scope of their employment; (2) although the agent in question must be acting with the intent, 
at least in part, to benefit the partnership, it was not necessary that the agent’s primary motive 
was to benefit the partnership; (3) although the agent’s criminal act must have related directly 
to the performance of the agent’s general duties for the partnership, it was not necessary for 
the particular act itself to have been authorized by the partnership; (4) indeed, a partnership 
may be held responsible for its agents’ acts performed within the scope of their employment 
even though the agents’ conduct is contrary to the partnership’s actual instructions or stated 
policies; and (5) the agent in question need not be a high level or managerial agent in order 
for his or her act to be attributable to the firm.” Upon reflection, Ainslie’s reaction to such a 
jury instruction was, “This is the law, but in this respect, to quote Dickens’ Mr. Bumble, the 
law is an ass.”). See generally Court’s Instructions to the Jury at 4–5, United States v. Arthur 
Andersen, No. 02-121 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2002).  
 94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c). 
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The MPC defines “high managerial agent” as an officer “or any 
other agent of a corporation or association having duties of such 
responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the 
policy of the corporation or association.”95 Moreover, the Code 
provides an affirmative defense if a corporate defendant can show, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, “that the high managerial agent 
having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the 
offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission.”96 
Ainslie argues that adopting the MPC language, and 
incorporating that language into federal jury instructions, would 
make the federal government’s position conform more closely with 
the majority of states that have addressed the issue themselves, 
whether through state statutes97 or through common law doctrine.98 
Ainslie further argues that the federal judiciary, having allowed the 
respondeat superior doctrine to “metastasize from the civil side onto 
the criminal side,” could and should work to “reverse the growth.”99 
Professors Joshua Greenberg and Ellen Brotman set forth 
criticisms in a similar vein, opining that federal appellate courts do 
not allow a corporation “to defend itself by showing that the 
employee’s conduct violated its compliance policy or a directive from 
a superior.”100 These scholars declare that, for numerous reasons, 
strict vicarious criminal liability for corporations is “unfair, is bad 
public policy, and should be abolished.”101 
 
 95. Id. § 2.07(4)(c). 
 96. Id. § 2.07(5). 
 97. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11-16-130 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-305 
(2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-311 (2009). 
 98. See, e.g., State v. Smokey’s Steakhouse, Inc., 478 N.W.2d 361, 362 (N.D. 1991). 
Note that some states have adopted standards that are even more strict than those set forth in 
the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., State v. Adjustment Dep’t Credit Bureau, 483 P.2d 687, 691 
(Idaho 1971) (adopting a standard modeled after the Model Penal Code but refusing to adopt 
the respondeat superior liability provision set forth in § 2.07(1)(a) of the Code). In other 
jurisdictions, the state legislature has limited corporate criminal liability to very specific 
circumstances or crimes. See, e.g., State v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 835 So.2d 230, 
233–34 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). 
 99. Ainslie, supra note 64, at 123. 
 100. Joshua D. Greenberg & Ellen C. Brotman, Strict Vicarious Criminal Liability for 
Corporations and Corporate Executives: Stretching the Boundaries of Criminalization, 51 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 79, 84 (2014). 
 101. The reasons include the following: 
First, it subjects a corporation to criminal liability when a single rogue employee 
engages in misconduct—even if the misconduct directly violates the corporation’s 
policies and occurs despite a rigorous compliance program. As a result, “a single 
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errant employee can cause the downfall of a multi-national corporation and the loss 
of thousands of jobs.”  
Second, it treats responsible corporations the same as corporations that fail to take 
reasonable efforts to prevent misconduct. The two are not similarly situated, 
however. Insofar as a corporation can be blameworthy, a corporation that has 
implemented a robust compliance policy is less deserving of blame than is a 
corporation that has failed to adopt a compliance policy. Yet strict vicarious criminal 
liability treats the two equally. 
Third, it reduces corporations’ incentives to implement vigorous and effective 
compliance policies, as the absence of such policies has no effect on whether a 
corporation is subject to strict vicarious liability for its employees’ criminal acts. 
Indeed, strict vicarious criminal liability may actually deter corporations from having 
robust compliance policies. When a compliance policy yields information about 
criminal acts, that information can end up being used by the government to indict 
the corporation. Corporations may decide that they are better off without 
compliance policies that could produce evidence that would support strict vicarious 
criminal liability. 
Fourth, it does not serve any legitimate deterrent or retributive purpose because it 
punishes corporations that not only did nothing wrong, but also took reasonable 
steps to prevent misconduct by their employees. When a corporation whose 
employee committed a criminal act had in place a robust compliance policy, 
subjecting the corporation to strict vicarious criminal liability based on that act does 
not serve to deter insufficiently vigorous compliance efforts. Likewise, a corporation 
with a robust compliance policy in place did not do anything wrong, so no 
retributive purpose is served by holding it criminally liable for its 
employee’s misconduct. 
Fifth, it punishes innocent shareholders and employees, whereas the persons who are 
actually responsible for the crimes could be punished without the unfair 
consequences of holding the corporation criminally liable. 
Sixth, when the employee who committed the misconduct is convicted of a crime, 
convicting the corporation as well results in duplicative liability. This is inconsistent 
with the doctrine of respondeat superior that underlies vicarious corporate criminal 
liability. In the civil context, a tort plaintiff cannot obtain a full recovery from an 
agent of a corporation and also recover from the corporation itself under a 
respondeat superior theory; the corporation’s “obligation is discharged when full 
satisfaction is obtained against the agent.” With strict vicarious criminal liability, 
however, the corporation and the offending employee can each be punished for the 
same crime. 
Seventh, it gives prosecutors too much power, as the threat of a prosecution based 
on one employee’s misconduct can force a corporation to enter into a deferred 
prosecution agreement or a non-prosecution agreement, which itself may have 
substantial consequences. Given “the profound impact of an indictment and the lack 
of a defense to vicarious liability, the mere threat of criminal sanctions based on the 
actions of an individual employee has been enough to compel corporations to settle 
non-meritorious claims.” 
Eighth, and finally, civil liability for the corporation and prosecution of the offending 
employee are sufficient to remedy the harm caused by an employee’s misconduct. 
Any physical or financial injury caused by an employee’s misconduct can be 
adequately compensated by holding the corporation liable in a civil case. There is no 
need to take the additional step of subjecting the corporation to strict vicarious 
criminal liability. Id. at 85–86 (citations omitted). 
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I will leave it to other scholars to put forth proposals to reform 
criminal liability in the context of corporate law.102 My objective 
today is to attempt to convince the reader that the current state of 
the law could easily lead counsel to believe that attempting to defend 
a corporate client against criminal liability at trial is a risky 
proposition indeed and that accepting an offer of deferred 
prosecution might be very wise, even if it means agreeing to steep 
demands placed from a hard-bargain-driving prosecutor on the other 
side of the negotiation table.103 
III. UNCONSTRAINED PROSECUTORIAL POWER, REVOLVING 
DOORS, AND LACK OF PUNISHMENT 
A. Unconstrained Prosecutorial Power 
Beginning in 1999, the DOJ issued four key memoranda setting 
forth prosecution guidelines or principles underlying prosecutors’ 
charging decisions with respect to corporate enforcement.104 Each 
 
 102. See, e.g., Gallo & Greenfield, supra note 51, at 544 (putting forth a proposal for 
reform wherein an employee’s malfeasance would “expose the corporation to criminal liability 
only where the current common law elements are satisfied and at least some member of senior 
management possessed the mens rea set forth in the underlying criminal statute. Our proposal 
also incorporates an improved affirmative-compliance-program defense, permitting the 
corporation to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the body of individuals 
comprising senior management maintained and oversaw a robust compliance program 
designed to prevent the type of conduct charged”); see also Greenberg & Brotman, supra note 
100, at 95 (arguing that the doctrines of strict vicarious criminal liability for corporations and 
corporate executives have “unfair and pernicious consequences” which could be mitigated by 
“(i) requiring that a statute clearly mandate strict vicarious criminal liability before such liability 
is imposed and (ii) allowing an affirmative defense that the corporation had a reasonable 
compliance policy and that the responsible corporate officer made reasonable efforts to 
implement that policy”). 
 103. O’Sullivan, supra note 13, at 34 (“It is exceedingly difficult to conceive of the 
criminal process that applies to corporations today as truly ‘adversarial.’ In reality, a variety of 
circumstances make it very difficult for public companies, especially those in regulated 
industries or those who do significant business with the government, to mount any meaningful 
resistance to a criminal investigation.”) (citation omitted). 
 104. See Memorandum from the Dep’t of Justice, Eric H. Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., Bringing 
Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF [“Holder 
Memo”]; Memorandum from the Dep’t of Justice, Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., 
Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Jan. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan2
0_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf [“Thompson memo”]; Memorandum from the Dep’t of Justice, 
Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs., available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty_memo.pdf [“McNulty 
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memo built upon and refined the reasoning and arguments of its 
predecessor, finally culminating in the so-called “Filip 
Memorandum,” issued by then Deputy Attorney General Mark R. 
Filip. Officially titled “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations” (“Principles of Prosecution”), the memo was 
codified in the United States Attorney’s Manual on August 28, 
2008.105 The Principles of Prosecution instruct federal prosecutors to 
consider the following nine factors when determining whether or not 
to charge a corporation or business entity: 
(1) The nature and seriousness of the offense, including the 
risk of harm to the public, and applicable policies and 
priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations 
for particular categories of crime; 
(2) The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, 
including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the 
wrongdoing by corporate management; 
(3) The corporation’s history of similar conduct, including 
prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions 
against it; 
(4) The corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation of its agents; 
(5) The existence and adequacy of the corporation’s pre-
existing compliance program; 
(6) the corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts 
to implement an effective corporate compliance program or 
to improve an existing one, to replace responsible 
management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay 
restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant 
government  agencies; 
(7) collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm 
to shareholders, pension holders, and employees not proven 
 
memo”]. For a thoughtful discussion of the various revisions made by the DOJ to each successive 
memorandum, see Dane C. Ball & Daniel E. Bolia, Ending a Decade of Federal Prosecutorial Abuse in the 
Corporate Criminal Charging Decision, 9 WYO. L. REV. 229, 239–49 (2009). 
 105. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-28.000 
through 9-28.1300 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-
charging-guidelines.pdf. 
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personally culpable, as well as impact on the public arising 
from the prosecution; 
(8) the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals 
responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance; and 
(9) the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory 
enforcement actions.106 
Reading the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations might lead one to believe that much of the harm 
caused by the respondeat superior corporate criminal liability regime 
has been mitigated—that the government has found a way, through 
its practice of making charging decisions, to consider factors other 
than the principles of vicarious liability set forth in the New York 
Central case, discussed previously. To a certain extent, that is true; 
the government has provided a way to ensure that other factors will 
be considered during the charging process. 
But these factors will be incorporated only if the prosecutor 
chooses to do so, and only to the extent that he or she wishes. This 
is because while federal prosecutors are obligated to review the 
Principles of Prosecution to see how they might apply within a 
particular case, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual states explicitly that the 
Principles do not serve to create any legal rights whatsoever for the 
parties involved: “The Manual provides only internal Department of 
Justice guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be 
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, 
enforceable at law by any party in a matter civil or criminal.”107 
Moreover, the Filip Memo makes it clear that federal prosecutors 
retain significant charging discretion, notwithstanding the various 
factors set forth in the Principles of Prosecution: “In making a 
decision to charge a corporation, the prosecutor generally has 
substantial latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even 
 
 106. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL: PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 9-28.300 through 9-28.1100 
(2008) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF PROSECUTION], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ usam/title9/28mcrm.htm. 
 107. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-1.100 (updated May 
2009) (emphasis added), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ 
usam/title1/1mdoj.htm/.  
REILLY.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:18 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
336 
whether to prosecute for violations of federal criminal law.”108 
Indeed, the last sentence of the Filip Memo states, “Nor are any 
limitations hereby placed on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives 
of the Department of Justice,” thereby emphasizing yet again the 
wide and largely unconstrained discretion given to prosecutors in 
carrying out their charging duties.109 
The bottom line is that, given the current respondeat superior 
corporate criminal liability regime, it would be quite 
understandable for a defense attorney to be wary if a client has 
been targeted by the DOJ regarding possible criminal liability. 
Despite the seemingly reasonable and fair guiding principles set 
forth in the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations, there is no way of knowing to what extent those 
principles will influence prosecutors’ decisions. 
Moreover, if the doctrine of respondeat superior gives 
companies the incentive to dispose of a given matter by agreeing to 
a DPA, the system thereby loses one of the strongest elements in 
place to ensure that prosecutors behave in a fair and judicious 
manner toward the accused: the trial by jury. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court tells us, “The purpose of a jury is to guard against the 
exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense 
judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or 
mistaken prosecutor.”110 Thus, with the highly decreased likelihood 
of cases going to trial, what protections are in place to prevent the 
negative impacts that can result from a prosecutor’s wrongful 
accusation, or overly-aggressive charge? 
Finally, if a company believes that going to trial is too risky due 
to the doctrine of respondeat superior, this severely weakens the 
company’s “BATNA,” or Best Alternative to a Negotiated 
 
 108. See Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t 
Components & U.S. Att’ys, at 4 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf. 
 109. See id. at 21. See also Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 1775, 1778 (2011) (“Federal prosecutors possess extraordinarily wide discretion as 
compared to their counterparts around the globe.”). 
 110. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968)). See also Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 
1457 (2007) (“Without the fear of trial. . .there is no assurance that the prosecutor is 
acting in a judicious manner.”). 
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Agreement.111  In other words, the option of going to trial would 
ordinarily present companies with a reasonable alternative to the 
prospect of accepting a DPA offer from the government.  However, 
if a company believes it realistically cannot go to trial because doing 
so would have devastating consequences for the company, then the 
government has substantial (if not overwhelming) power not only in 
convincing the company to agree to a DPA, but also in negotiating 
the terms of the DPA—power that could potentially result in 
arbitrary or unfair deal terms for the company.112 
B. The “Revolving Door” and Its Possible Impact on Prosecutorial 
Charging Decisions 
As one example of how prosecutors might have too much 
discretion in the area of charging, consider the question of whether 
prosecutors might be influenced in their charging decisions by their 
post-DOJ job prospects. 
It is difficult to answer this question with much certainty; former 
Department of Justice litigator Joseph Covington has spoken 
candidly of what he perceives to be a revolving door between the 
DOJ and private law practice. Commenting on his particular area of 
expertise, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Covington says, “this is 
good business for law firms . . . for accounting firms . . . for 
 
 111. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 100 (1991) (defining BATNA as “the standard against 
which any proposed agreement should be measured. That is the only standard which can 
protect you both from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it 
would be in your interest to accept”); see generally CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL 
NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (6th ed. 2009). 
 112. See Greenblum, supra note 18 at 1885 (“The corporate offender’s unique 
vulnerability to adverse publicity and collateral consequences . . . calls into question whether 
the choice to enter into deferral is really a choice at all.”). See also Paulsen, supra note 110, at 
1436 (“It has become increasingly clear that the government holds all the cards in negotiations 
over these [deferred prosecution] agreements. As long as the threat of prosecution lingers over 
a company, the corporation is compelled to agree to the prosecutor’s terms, vesting nearly 
absolute power in the government’s hands. Unable to risk a potential indictment, the 
corporation is thus left at the mercy of the prosecutor.”); Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The 
Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the 
Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 26 (2010) (“Commentators generally 
express concern regarding the government’s use of DPAs and NPAs. One significant and 
frequently raised issue is the bargaining imbalance between corporations and the government. 
Many scholars argue that ‘prosecutors abuse their powerful bargaining position’ in forcing 
organizations to agree to ‘overly intrusive—and in some cases arguably arbitrary—terms.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
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consulting firms . . . and Justice Department lawyers who create the 
marketplace and then get [themselves] a job.”113 
It is difficult to know exactly how much the door might 
“revolve” between the DOJ and private law firms, or how big the 
pay differential can be between the two types of jobs, as this 
information is rarely made public (at least with respect to the law 
firm positions). One example is the case of Mark Mendelsohn, who 
was Deputy Chief of the DOJ Fraud Section and the attorney 
responsible for overseeing all DOJ investigations and prosecutions 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) from 2005 to 
2010.114 Upon leaving DOJ in 2010, Mendelsohn began building an 
FCPA practice with a private law firm in Washington, D.C. for a 
reported annual salary of $2.5 million.115 
William M. Palmer, an attorney practicing in Boston, 
Massachusetts, who was a federal prosecutor in the 1990s, argues the 
current situation demonstrates that there has been “regulatory 
capture by the elites . . . in part instantiated by the fact that many 
DOJ attorneys plan to take white-shoe law firm jobs that pay 
extraordinarily well.”116 Palmer suggests that because nearly all the 
future clients will be companies and company executives, “[i]t is 
hard to get potential clients to warm up to you when you have a 
history of aggressively putting their contemporaries in prison.”117 
Finally, there is Judge Jed Rakoff, who wrote an article 
entitled, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives 
Been Prosecuted?118 Judge Rakoff says he “completely discount[s]” 
the argument that “no such prosecutions have been brought 
because the top prosecutors were often people who previously 
represented the financial institutions in question and/or were 
people who expected to be representing such institutions in the 
 
 113. Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES, June 7, 2010, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortion-
mendelsohn-bribery-racket.html. 
 114. Mark F. Mendelsohn, Partner Profile, Law Firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & 
Garrison LLP, available at http://www.paulweiss.com/professionals/partners-and-
counsel/mark-f-mendelsohn.aspx. 
 115. Vardi, supra note 113.  
 116. William M. Palmer, Esq., Comment to Too Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/opinion/hsbc-too-big-to-indict.html. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Rakoff, supra note 43. 
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future: the so-called ‘revolving door.’”119 However, he 
subsequently makes an argument as to why a prosecutor might be 
influenced by that very revolving door when deciding between 
two different kinds of cases to prosecute: 
I would venture to guess that the cases involving the financial crisis 
were parceled out to Assistant [US attorneys] who [were also 
responsible for] insider-trading cases. Which do you think an 
assistant would devote most of her attention to: an insider-trading 
case that was already nearly ready to go to indictment and that 
might lead to a high-visibility trial, or a financial crisis case that was 
just getting started, would take years to complete, and had no 
guarantee of even leading to an indictment? Of course, she would 
put her energy into the insider-trading case, and if she was lucky, it 
would go to trial, she would win, and, in some cases, she would then 
take a job with a large law firm. And in the process, the financial 
fraud case would get lost in the shuffle.120 
I believe Judge Rakoff sets forth a strong case for how 
prosecutors might in fact let post-DOJ job prospects impact their 
prosecution decisions, i.e., how the so-called revolving door might 
be influencing prosecutors’ decisions. He cites an example of how a 
prosecutor’s decision might be influenced in order to make his or 
her resume look more appealing to prospective employers, which 
some might say is less pernicious than having a decision influenced 
because the prosecutor used to represent the institutions in question 
or because the prosecutor expected to represent the institutions in 
the future. However, in all three scenarios, the idea of a “revolving 
door” appears to be playing a role.121 
C. Pursuing Companies Instead of Individuals? Reforming Corporate 
‘Culture’ Instead of Punishing Misbehavior? 
1. Pursuing companies 
In his article, Judge Rakoff offers several “influences” that he 
believes have had the effect of limiting prosecutions of high-level 
executives. Of the factors he mentions, he suggests the one that is 
the “most subtle . . . the most systemic . . . and arguably the most 
 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. 
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important . . .  is the shift that has occurred, over the past thirty 
years or more, from focusing on prosecuting high-level individuals to 
focusing on prosecuting companies and other institutions.”122 
Specifically, Rakoff points out that while prosecutors have charged 
companies with various crimes for more than a century, “until 
relatively recently, such prosecutions were the exception, and 
prosecutions of companies without simultaneous prosecutions of their 
managerial agents were even rarer.”123 
This is an aspect of recent corporate criminal cases that one 
might find quite disturbing: in going after the company, where are 
the simultaneous prosecutions of managerial agents? As Judge Rakoff 
notes: “In recent decades, . . . prosecutors have been increasingly 
attracted to prosecuting companies, often even without indicting a 
single individual.”124 
Judge Rakoff points out that this shift in focus is often 
“rationalized as part of an attempt to transform ‘corporate 
cultures,’” thereby (hopefully) leading to reduced future criminal 
activity. As a result, the government has turned to using DPAs, 
which the judge believes “has led to some lax and dubious behavior 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. See also, Jesse Eisinger, Seeking Tough Justice, but Settling for Empty Promises, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/seeking-tough-
justice-but-settling-for-empty-promises/ (pointing out that charges were not brought against 
individuals in either of two highly-publicized cases involving HSBC and Toyota, both of which 
were resolved through DPAs. The writer relies on the research of Professor Brandon Garrett to 
suggest that “follow-up charges against executives are rare. Disturbingly, in the biggest 
corporate convictions, which are ostensibly more serious actions, charges against individual 
executives are even rarer.” The writer concludes that the current situation provides incentives 
for top company executives who see or suspect wrongdoing within their organization to 
“[d]evelop a powerful case of incuriosity, cancel meetings with the auditors, send the 
compliance officers on vacation to the Aleutian Islands. Revel in ignorance. And you stand an 
excellent chance of skating”); Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, BNP Paribas Admits 
Guilt and Agrees to Pay $8.9 Billion Fine to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2014, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/bnp-paribas-pleads-guilty-in-sanctions-case 
(pointing out that while BNP agreed to plead guilty to various crimes and to pay an $8.9 
billion penalty, no BNP employees had been criminally charged in the matter); and Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements: A Better Option Than Indictment?, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE 
COUNSEL (NORTHEAST EDITION), May 2008, http://www.nmmlaw.com/pdf/prosagr.pdf 
(in an interview with the Editor, former U.S. Attorney Bryan Blaney states that DPAs are most 
often “used by prosecutors to obviate criminal indictments against individuals when the 
government sought to obtain financial restitution and restrict conduct, but did not view 
imprisonment as a necessary penalty.”). 
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on the part of prosecutors, with deleterious results.”125 Clearly, the 
judge seems to favor prosecutions over DPAs: 
Just going after the company is . . . both technically and 
morally suspect. It is technically suspect because, under the 
law, you should not indict or threaten to indict a company 
unless you can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that some 
managerial agent of the company committed the alleged crime; 
and if you can prove that, why not indict the manager? And 
from a moral standpoint, punishing a company and its many 
innocent employees and shareholders for the crimes committed 
by some unprosecuted individuals seems contrary to 
elementary notions of moral responsibility.126 
Interestingly, even the DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution 
of Business Organizations suggest that prosecution of individuals is 
to be a priority over prosecuting companies:  
Where a decision is made to charge a corporation, it does not 
necessarily follow that individual directors, officers, employees, or 
shareholders should not also be charged. Prosecution of a 
corporation is not a substitute for the prosecution of criminally 
culpable individuals within or without the corporation. Because a 
corporation can act only through individuals, imposition of 
individual criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent 
against future corporate wrongdoing. Only rarely should provable 
individual culpability not be pursued . . . .127 
This language begs the question, why, in recent years, has the 
DOJ seemed to go against its own charging guidelines by shifting 
the focus of enforcement action from high-level individuals to 
companies?128 Judge Rakoff states that if the financial crisis was 
caused by fraudulent misconduct, then “the failure of the 
government to bring to justice those responsible . . . bespeaks 
weaknesses in our prosecutorial system that need to be 
addressed.”129 It appears that a key factor in causing such 
 
 125. Rakoff supra note 43. 
 126. Id. 
 127. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.200.B 
(2008) (emphasis added). 
 128. Indeed, former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer states unequivocally that 
“the strongest deterrent against corporate crime is the prospect of prison time for individual 
employees.” Breuer, supra note 12. 
 129. Rakoff, supra note 43. 
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weaknesses in the prosecutorial system—whether in prosecuting 
crimes of fraud or crimes in other areas—might be the shift from 
targeting high-level individuals to targeting companies and 
reforming corporate culture.130 
2. Reforming Corporate Culture 
What is the fundamental role of a federal prosecutor in the 
context of corporate criminal law? Is it to “seek justice”?131 Is it to 
somehow reform “corporate culture” so that companies and the 
people who run them will be less likely to commit crimes in the 
future? Is it to prosecute and punish illegal activity? Is it a 
combination of all three of these? 
Attorneys Peter Spivack and Sujit Raman suggest that the DOJ’s 
view of the role of corporate criminal enforcement has undergone a 
fundamental shift: “In a post-Enron world, DOJ officials appear to 
believe that the principal role of corporate criminal enforcement is to 
reform corrupt corporate cultures—that is, to effect widespread 
structural reform—rather than to indict, to prosecute, and to 
punish.”132 The authors add that “[b]y focusing more on prospective 
questions of corporate governance and compliance, and less on the 
retrospective question of the [company]’s criminal liability, federal 
prosecutors have fashioned a new role for themselves in policing, 
and supervising, corporate America.”133 
 
 130. But see Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, Why So Few Individuals? Government’s 
Prosecution of Corporate Misconduct, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 2013 (“Whatever the specifics in a 
given case, individuals should often not be charged with offenses to which a company has 
pleaded guilty—either because the government’s legal theory was flawed, the government 
lacked sufficient proof or the individuals were simply not guilty. . . . [I]n the majority of cases 
in which corporations settle charges, individuals are most likely not charged because the 
government has reasonably concluded that its theory and evidence are not sufficiently strong 
to establish individual liability.”). 
 131. See generally Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 607, 642 (1998) (“[A] prosecutor is a representative of, as well as a lawyer for, a 
government entity that has several different, sometimes seemingly inconsistent, objectives in 
the criminal context. Of these, convicting and punishing lawbreakers is only one, and it is no 
more important than the others, such as avoiding the punishment of innocent people and 
ensuring that people are treated fairly. As the government’s surrogate, the prosecutor’s job is 
to carry out all these objectives and resolve the tension among them.”). 
 132. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 161 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. (emphasis added). See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 
VA. L. REV. 853, 886–87 (2007) (“Like the explosion of public interest law firms in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s pursuing structural reform, the DOJ has now consciously adopted a structural reform 
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To decide whether or not to charge a corporate entity, federal 
prosecutors are advised to “ensure that the general purposes of the 
criminal law—assurance of warranted punishment, deterrence of 
further criminal conduct, protection of the public from dangerous 
and fraudulent conduct, rehabilitation of offenders, and restitution 
for victims and affected communities—are adequately met.”134 As 
Professor Peter Henning explains, however, the approach taken 
toward individuals, as compared to that taken toward corporations, 
seems to be different in at least one important aspect: 
The criminal law is retrospective in nature, asking whether proof of 
the defendant’s act and mental state at the time of the offense are 
sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For 
corporations, however, simply assessing past conduct is not as 
important as determining whether the organization is in need of 
reform to ensure future compliance.135 
This is related to what Professor Julie O’Sullivan calls 
“galvanizing deterrence,” which she says 
requires forward-looking rehabilitation and incapacitation in the 
form of disciplining the wrongdoing agents, reforming the policies 
and procedures that promoted or sanctioned wrongdoing, 
implementation or improvement of a compliance program that will 
prevent and deter future crimes, and a revamping of the corporate 
culture that encouraged or tolerated criminal wrongs.136 
Practically speaking, what does this mean for a corporate entity? 
It can result in DPAs that contain provisions requiring a company to 
(1) change compensation or sales practices and/or incentive 
structures; (2) modify (or even bring to an end) consulting and/or 
contracting agreements previously made with other businesses, 
individuals, and entities; (3) change the membership and/or 
structure of the company’s board of directors; (4) replace certain 
company officers, auditors, or other employees; (5) establish new (or 
improve already-existing) compliance and ethics programs within the 
 
litigation strategy in the wake of Enron and dozens of other high-profile corporate malfeasance scandals. 
A structural reform paradigm is different from the traditional role of prosecutors, which focuses on 
seeking convictions.”) (footnote omitted). 
 134. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 18, § 9-28.300(B). 
 135. Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1435 (2009) (second emphasis added). 
 136. O’Sullivan, supra note 13, at 44. 
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company; and (6) terminate certain lines of business.137 Some legal 
experts wonder aloud if such provisions go too far or if the 
prosecutors demanding the changes have adequate expertise in 
business as well as law.138 Indeed, Professor John Coffee argues that 
DPAs have “intruded deeply into corporate governance” and that 
many of the changes required of companies amount to 
“experimentation in corporate governance by a prosecutor who lacks 
any empirical basis for believing that these reforms will reduce the 
risk of future recidivism.”139 
Top DOJ officials suggest that changes mandated through DPAs 
result in much-needed culture reform. As one official put it, “along 
with the other tools we have, DPAs have had a truly transformative 
effect on particular companies and, more generally, on corporate 
culture across the globe.”140 
The question is do we really want our federal prosecutors to 
focus on reforming corporate culture rather than on indicting, 
prosecuting, and punishing? Moreover, how do we currently ensure 
that federal prosecutors have the necessary training and experience to 
effectively carry out that mission? Are all of them trained in business 
as well as the law? After all, the role of the prosecutor “is generally 
understood to be limited to determining whether a given case merits 
federal prosecution and, if so, which charges should be brought. 
 
 137. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has It Gone Too Far?, NAT’L L. J., July 25, 
2005, at 13; Garrett, supra note 133, at 936 (“Federal prosecutors have stepped far outside of their 
traditional role of obtaining convictions, and, in doing so, seek to reshape the governance of leading 
corporations, public entities, and ultimately entire industries.”); Paul E. McGreal, Corporate 
Compliance Survey, 64 BUS. LAW. 253, 260–61 (2008) (discussing how DPAs can force governance 
reforms upon companies, including requiring additional independent directors on the company 
board, or requiring the creation of a new board committee or the reconfiguring of an already-
existing board committee); P.J. Meitl, Who’s the Boss? Prosecutorial Involvement in Corporate 
America, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2007) (describing how DPAs “go to the heart of corporate 
governance matters, normally reserved for the Board of Directors” with examples such as requiring a 
company to add an independent board member, to cease private client compensation and benefits 
practices, to change the management of the company, and to require the addition of new seats on 
the board); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 475–76 
(2008) (describing DOJ’s DPA “with KPMG as part [of a] multi-billion dollar criminal tax fraud 
investigation. . . . The . . . agreement . . . impose[d] . . . restrictions on KPMG’s tax practice, 
including requiring the firm to[(1)] cease (with limited exceptions) its private client tax practice as 
well as its compensation and benefits practice; [(2)] refrain from developing, marketing, selling, or 
implementing pre-packaged tax products; and [(3)] restrict severely its tax preparation services”). 
 138. See Daniel R. Alonso, Use Caution in Negotiating Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1, 2006, at 4. 
 139. Coffee, supra note 137. 
 140. Breuer, supra note 12. 
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With deferred prosecutions, however, prosecutors have been 
tempted ‘to experiment with corporate governance in ways that 
exceed their competence or entitlement.’”141 
Moreover, while the DOJ is touting the ability of DPAs to 
transform corporate culture “across the globe,”142 the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has come to the 
conclusion that the DOJ is simply not in a position to evaluate DPA 
effectiveness in combating crime.143 The GAO concluded that the 
“DOJ cannot evaluate and demonstrate the extent to which DPAs 
and NPAs . . . contribute to the department’s efforts to combat 
corporate crime because it has no measures to assess their 
effectiveness,”144 and “therefore, it could be difficult for DOJ to 
justify its increasing use of these tools.”145 In a similar vein, a report 
issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) that addressed Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
enforcement issues stated that the “actual deterrent effect” of DPAs 
“has not been quantified.”146 
If these assessments by the GAO and the OECD are accurate 
and the DOJ is neither in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of 
DPAs nor to measure how much such agreements lead to real and 
lasting corporate reform, then it seems that the DOJ’s contention 
that deferred prosecution has had a “transformative effect” on 
corporate culture throughout the world is speculative at best. 
Finally, critics argue that DPAs simply do not offer the same 
deterrent effect as do criminal prosecutions, that “the approach of 
letting corporations escape with monetary fines as long as they 
promise to self-regulate creates no disincentives for corporations to 
 
 141. Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 37, at 1312–13 (footnote omitted) (quoting Coffee, 
supra note 137, at 13); see also O’Sullivan, supra note 13, at 69–70 (“[DPAs] transform 
prosecutors into regulators, raising serious questions of competency and legitimacy (not to 
mention over-deterrence and waste of scarce government resources).”). 
 142. Breuer, supra note 12. 
143.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ 
HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION 
AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS (2009). 
144.   Id.at 20. 
 145. Id. 
 146. OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE 
OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES para. 54 (2010). 
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abstain from fraud or white-collar crime.”147 It seems reasonable to 
arrive at the conclusion that if the threat of criminal liability is 
essentially removed, then corporate decision makers will be more 
willing to engage in criminal misconduct.148 As one commentator 
sums it up: “DPAs may make it financially viable for corporations to 
bear the risk of criminal business practices due to financial gains 
made from such practices without the threat of an indictment.”149 
D. Are Prosecutors Extracting a Pound of Flesh When it’s Not 
Warranted? 
From a defense perspective, a deferred prosecution is 
preferable to indictment, but companies would nonetheless prefer 
a declination. The question is whether prosecutors will offer 
deferred prosecution when they otherwise would have declined to 
prosecute.150 SEC Chair Mary Jo White, during her previous 
tenure as partner at a private law firm, was clear in her position 
that DPAs should be limited “to situations where [the 
government] certainly would have indicted otherwise for all the 
right reasons on their part.”151 
While one can only speculate as to whether or not that is always 
what occurs, it seems that many people believe the worst: “Most 
observers . . . contend that diversion agreements actually have 
replaced declinations, providing prosecutors with an opportunity to 
extract a pound of flesh when previously they would have had to 
settle for nothing.”152 And a top DOJ official bolsters this 
contention when he states publicly, “Companies now 
know . . . that they will be answerable even for conduct that in years 
 
 147. Ellis W. Martin, Comment, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: ‘Too Big to Jail’ and the 
Potential of Judicial Oversight Combined with Congressional Legislation, 18 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 457, 468 (2014). 
 148. Eliason, supra note 82 (“With the threat of criminal liability effectively off the table, 
corporate executives may be more willing to skate aggressively close to the line—or to jump 
over it. If the prospect of real criminal sanctions against the company is removed, then 
engaging in criminal activity becomes just another dollars-and-cents decision.”). 
 149. Martin, supra note 147, at 469; see also Eric Lichtblau, In Justice Shift, Corporate 
Deals Replace Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, at A1. 
 150. See Eugene Illovsky, Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Brewing 
Debate, 21 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2006, at 36, 37 (“[S]ome question whether the government 
is getting deferred prosecution agreements in cases it would otherwise decline.”). 
 151. Interview with Mary Jo White, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, New 
York, CORP. CRIME REP., Dec. 12, 2005, at 11, 14 (emphasis added). 
 152. Spivack & Raman, supra note 132, at 188.  
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past would have resulted in a declination.”153 Surely this official was 
not trying to suggest that the government would try to take 
advantage of the situation by “extracting an unjustified pound of 
flesh,” but, nevertheless, the possibility for such an occurrence 
seems quite real and deeply troubling. 
The question then becomes how do we know whether this is 
actually taking place? While we cannot read the minds of 
prosecutors, the next best thing might be to get an honest reading of 
the situation from current or former highly placed, experienced 
prosecutors within the DOJ. Mark Mendelsohn, who was Deputy 
Chief of the DOJ Fraud Section and the attorney responsible for 
overseeing all DOJ investigations and prosecutions under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act from 2005 to 2010, is just such a 
person. Mendelsohn stated in an interview that there is a “danger” 
posed by DPAs because it can be “tempting” for DOJ attorneys “to 
seek to resolve cases through DPAs or NPAs that don’t actually 
constitute violations of the law.”154 When asked if the DOJ did not 
have the option of deferred prosecution, but instead had to choose 
between prosecution and declination, Mendelsohn stated, “If the 
Department only had the option of bringing a criminal case or 
declining to bring a case, you would certainly bring fewer cases.”155 
Moreover, former U.S. Deputy Attorney General Larry 
Thompson stated in a speech that, “While I believe that most 
government officials are fair and high-minded in making these sorts 
of determinations [to prosecute], there are forces at work that can 
create a temptation for even the most sensible of these prosecutors 
to deviate sometimes.”156 And what are these “forces” at play? 
Thompson suggests they vary and can include prosecutors who wish 
to “make names for themselves through highly publicized 
prosecutions,”157 as well as prosecutors who are “stupid, malevolent, 
or a cowboy or cowgirl who just wants to try a case and does not 
want to be reasonable.”158 
 
 153. Breuer, supra note 12 (emphasis added). 
 154. Interview with Mark Mendelsohn, Partner, Paul Weiss, Washington, D.C., CORP. 
CRIME REP., Sept. 13, 2010, at 11, 14 (print edition only). 
 155. Id. at 15. 
 156. Larry D. Thompson, Keynote Speech: The Reality of Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 577, 582 (2011).  
 157. Id. 
 158. Larry D. Thompson, The Blameless Corporation, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1251, 1254 (2010). 
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Considering how much discretion prosecutors have through the 
Principles of Prosecution, the insights that these former high-ranking 
DOJ officials provide are troubling indeed. Thompson confirms this 
notion with his conclusion that while “these problems afflict only a 
very small minority of federal prosecutors, . . . it only takes one bad 
apple in one big prosecution to have a significant, deleterious effect 
on the justice system.”159 
And this is especially troubling given that, if a case ultimately 
ends up going to trial for whatever reason, prosecutors can use a 
previously-signed DPA to secure a conviction as the vast majority of 
DPAs require the company to admit to misconduct.160 As two 
practicing attorneys, both former federal prosecutors, observe, “the 
government . . . [is] armed with the company’s admission and all the 
evidence obtained from its cooperation, making conviction virtually 
a foregone conclusion.”161 And this power is compounded by the fact 
that most DPAs include a provision giving the government the 
exclusive and non-reviewable right to determine whether a breach of 
the agreement has occurred.162 For example, the government’s DPA 
with Saena Tech Corporation reads: 
 
 159. Larry D. Thompson, In-Sourcing Corporate Responsibility for Enforcement of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 199, 210 n.79 (2014). 
 160. Mythili Raman, the acting chief of DOJ’s Criminal Division, appeared before the 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee in 
2013 and stated that “regardless of the resolution—deferred prosecution, non prosecution or a 
guilty plea—the company must fully acknowledge it’s [sic] criminal wrongdoing and may not 
retract that.” Russell Mokhiber, Raman Defends Deferred and Non Prosecution Agreements for 
Major Corporate Crime Cases, CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, May 22, 2013, 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/ramanhousetestimony05222013/. 
Despite that testimony, Professor Brandon Garrett contends that, of the 232 corporate DPAs 
and NPAs he reviewed, 12 percent failed to admit guilt to or accept responsibility for the 
wrongdoing. Id. 
 161. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-
Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice,” 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1105 
(2006); see Michael Yangming Xiao, Note, Deferred/non Prosecution Agreements: Effective Tools 
to Combat Corporate Crime, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 241 (2013) (“[S]hould a 
case ultimately go to trial, prosecutors can use previous DPAs and NPAs as unfair shortcuts to 
secure a conviction.”). 
 162. See Xian, supra note 26, at 644–45 (“These agreements often include 
provisions in which the government is listed as the sole decider as to whether a breach has 
occurred. As a result, the question of whether a company actually breached the agreement 
is not subject to an objective trier-of-fact’s judgment, but posed to the government, 
which might have an ancillary interest in protecting the status of ‘successful’ deferred 
prosecution agreements.”) (footnote omitted); see also Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. 
Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 
96 KY. L.J. 1, 14 (2007) (“Although negotiated resolutions offer enormous economic 
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If, during the Term of this Agreement, the Office determines, in its 
sole discretion, that the Company or Mr. Kim have (a) committed any 
felony under U.S. federal law subsequent to the signing of this 
Agreement, (b) at any time provided in connection with this 
Agreement deliberately false, incomplete, or misleading 
information, or (c) otherwise breached the Agreement, the 
Company and Mr. Kim shall thereafter be subject to prosecution 
for any federal criminal violation of which the Office has 
knowledge, including the charges in the Information described in 
Paragraph 1. . . . In the event that the Office determines that the 
Company or Mr. Kim has breached this Agreement, the Office agrees 
to provide the Company and Mr. Kim with written notice of such 
breach prior to instituting any prosecution resulting from such 
breach. . . . In the event that the Office determines that the Company 
has breached this Agreement: (a) all statements made by or on behalf 
of the Company to the Office or to the Court, including the 
attached Statement of Facts, and any testimony given by or on 
behalf of the Company before a grand jury, a court, or any 
tribunal, or at any legislative hearings, whether prior or subsequent 
to this Agreement, and any leads derived from such statements or 
testimony, shall be admissible in evidence in any and all criminal 
proceedings brought by the Office against the Company.163 
Obviously, the government’s ability to—unilaterally and in its 
sole discretion—revoke a DPA and proceed with prosecution, 
increases the leverage exercised by prosecutors.164 Indeed, one 
commentator argues that the “unfairness and one-sidedness” of the 
situation must surely be the product of economic duress, stating, 
“There is no other reason for a corporate entity to subject itself to 
the final determination of an authority that opposes its interests.”165 
 
benefit, the omission of judicial oversight raises concerns when the determination of 
whether there is a breach of the agreement rests within the exclusive province of one 
party, and that party is the government, a party with extraordinary power.”). 
 163. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at para. 12–14, U.S. v. Saena Tech Corp., No. 
1:14-cr-00066 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2014). 
 164. See Paulsen, supra note 110 at 1464; see also Greenblum, supra note 18, at 1864 
(“Deferral is a powerful prosecutorial tool because it is negotiated and implemented exclusively 
by the prosecutor.”). 
 165. See Matt Senko, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 
19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 163, 178 (2009); see also Zierdt & Podgor , supra note 162, 
at 3 (“[T]he government acquires total power over the alleged corporate offender. The 
net result is that deferred prosecution agreements are reached without considering 
theories of duress and unconscionability.”). 
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1. The ‘Innocence Problem’ for DPAs 
This article has attempted to tease out various factors and forces 
tending to cause a company to be interested in obtaining a DPA 
when faced with a possible corporate criminal violation, and 
economic duress might be one of those factors—especially if a 
company believes, accurately or not, that indictment and/or trial 
could mean the equivalent of a death sentence for the company. But 
whatever the specific factors involved, the larger issue is one of 
power, leverage, and fairness in a dispute resolution process involving 
the government and the accused, and in that respect, there seems to 
be a clear parallel between issues surrounding DPA use in resolving 
corporate criminal matters, and what has come to be called the 
“innocence problem” in plea bargaining more generally. 
The innocence problem “is the recognition that when a 
prosecutor offers a defendant the opportunity to plead guilty in 
exchange for a more lenient punishment, the offer may lead an 
innocent defendant to plead guilty.”166 Evidence suggests that the 
availability of nolo contendere167 and Alford168 pleas act as 
encouraging forces upon the accused, thereby increasing the 
likelihood that an innocent party will engage in a plea agreement.169 
As one scholar notes, the innocence problem “strikes at the center of 
the criminal justice system, the integrity of which depends on the 
reliability of convictions.”170 
I would suggest that being offered a DPA by a prosecutor places 
a company squarely into the center of the innocence problem: the 
forces described in this article can work to convince an innocent 
company to accept the deal. Moreover, I disagree with the notion 
that such a scenario would be likely to unfold only when a “bad 
apple” prosecutor is driving such an outcome, as Thompson suggests 
above. Instead, I believe a system has been created, through the 
workings of the DOJ, wherein even good, honest prosecutors who 
are trying to be reasonable and fair, could mistakenly decide to offer 
 
 166. See Adam N. Stern, Note, Plea Bargaining, Innocence, and the Prosecutor’s Duty to 
“Do Justice,” 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1027 (2012) (citation omitted). 
 167. In a nolo contendere or “no contest” plea, the plea is similar to a guilty plea, but 
the defendant does not actually admit guilt. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 1370. 
 168. In an Alford plea, a defendant is permitted to plead guilty while proclaiming his or 
her innocence. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970). 
 169. See Stern, supra note 166, at 1028. 
 170. See id. (citation omitted). 
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a DPA to a company that has not violated the law. Furthermore, any 
rationally minded company placed in that position, even if 
completely innocent, might reasonably choose to accept the offer.171 
In essence, then, I would argue that DPAs provide the government 
with power that can potentially be unfair and exploitative in the 
enforcement of corporate criminal law,172 and currently there do not 
seem to be legal, legislative, or administrative systems or mechanisms 
in place to act as a set of checks and balances upon that power. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The evidence put forth in this Article suggests that DPAs serve as 
a disturbing wellspring of unfairness, double standards, and potential 
abuse of power.  I urge Congress to pass legislation halting the 
DOJ’s ability to use DPAs in the context of corporate criminal law 
enforcement—to formally eliminate what the DOJ refers to as the 
“middle ground” between declining to prosecute on the one hand, 
and trials or guilty pleas on the other.173  
 
 171. See Bohrer & Trencher, supra note 75, at 1483–84 (“With few rational business 
organizations willing to risk the consequences of an indictment, in the past few years we have 
seen a significant upswing in the number of investigations that culminated in a DPA.”); 
Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 37, at 1313 (“[T]he risk of collateral consequences of a 
criminal indictment—that is, the risk of an Arthur Andersen-style collapse—leaves corporations 
with no choice but to settle at all costs.”) (citation omitted). 
 172. Indeed, I would argue that just as the prosecutor in a plea bargain serves “not only 
as prosecutor but [also] as quasi-judge and jury,” so too does the prosecutor in a DPA 
negotiation. See Stern, supra note 166, at 1035 (2012) (“Because the judge and jury are 
absent in the plea bargaining context, the prosecutor must bear the burden of avoiding 
punishing the innocent. This burden is made more difficult to bear because the plea bargaining 
process lacks the protections that contribute to the accuracy of trial convictions, in particular 
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, cross-examination, and witness impeachment. These 
protections guard the integrity of the criminal justice process and tend to expose weaknesses in 
the government’s case which may not be apparent during plea bargaining. In order to comply 
with the duty to do justice in plea bargaining, the prosecutor must be far more sensitive to the 
possibility that the defendant is innocent than in the trial context. Making an offer that would be 
so enticing as to lead the defendant to plead guilty even if were in fact innocent would clearly 
be incompatible with the prosecutor’s burden of heightened sensitivity.”) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added); see also Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Common Law of Plea Bargaining, 
102 KY. L.J. 1, 1 (2013/2014) (in discussing plea bargaining, the author describes a situation 
that is nearly identical to that of a prosecutor negotiating a DPA with the accused: “The 
prosecutor-judges who resolve these cases do so without necessarily referring to how any other 
case was resolved and do not follow any particular procedure, formal or informal, in deciding 
how to make offers. Their decisions are not subject to review and largely avoid public 
scrutiny”) (citations omitted). 
 173. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 18; see also Greenblum, supra note 18.  
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In a speech before the New York Bar Association, former 
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer stated that DPAs result in 
“far greater accountability for corporate wrongdoing” than existed 
before their use and that in many ways DPAs have “the same 
punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative effect as a guilty plea.”174 Yet 
evidence put forth in this Article suggests that such comparisons 
cannot accurately be made, simply because we do not yet have the 
ability to accurately measure the effectiveness of each tool 
separately and independently (i.e., “DPA” versus “criminal 
conviction”), let alone the ability to compare the crime-fighting 
efficacy of these tools in order to determine whether one is 
superior. Thus, it appears that the assertions made by Breuer have 
not been proven to be accurate and correct. 
Moreover, when faced with a possible corporate crime, what if 
the government decided it would be easier, cheaper, faster, etc., to 
resolve the matter using a DPA, even when the law and facts of the 
case clearly indicated that the most appropriate course of action 
would be immediate prosecution? Or, in another situation, what if 
the government decided to use the threat of prosecution in order to 
secure a DPA, even when the law and facts clearly dictated a decision 
to decline any enforcement action whatsoever?175 In both instances, 
the pursuit of justice, consistency in the rule of law, and basic 
notions of fairness would be greatly compromised.176 
As set forth in this Article, the reasons for prohibiting the use of 
DPAs in the context of corporate criminal law enforcement are 
manifold, including: 
(1) DPAs make it appear that companies are essentially 
buying their way out of a prosecution; 
(2) Current DOJ policy gives prosecutors too much power 
and discretion regarding when, why, and how agency 
attorneys will (or will not) use DPAs, translating directly into 
 
 174. Breuer, supra note 12. 
 175. While there is no similar provision with respect to deferred prosecution agreements, 
it is well understood that “[c]riminal prosecution shall not be used as a threat to obtain civil 
settlement.” See ENRD Directive 0802: Parallel Proceedings Policy 8 (2008).  
 176. See Uhlmann, supra note 7, at 1344 (“Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements, if they occur at all, should be limited to relatively minor cases . . . where other 
non-criminal alternatives are inadequate.”). But see id. at 1342 (suggesting that DPAs should 
be allowed in “exceptional cases” where the government can “demonstrate that innocent third 
parties would suffer unacceptable harm”).  
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increased power and leverage while negotiating the 
agreements with alleged corporate wrongdoers; 
(3) DPAs weaken the deterrence that comes from the threat 
of criminal prosecution; 
(4) In cases in which the DOJ declines to move forward with 
prosecution, DPAs can be used to nevertheless extract a 
‘pound of flesh’ from the alleged wrongdoer, when 
previously the prosecutors would have been forced to walk 
away with nothing; 
(5) Because the government has the exclusive and non-
reviewable right to determine whether a breach of the DPA 
has occurred, targeted individuals and companies likely feel 
a strong sense of pressure to adhere to all DOJ requests and 
demands throughout the agreement’s deferral period, even 
if such requests and demands become unreasonable, unfair, 
and unjust; 
(6) Because DPAs do not involve a trial, their use forecloses 
the most effective means for any criminal justice system to 
rein in overly aggressive prosecutors;177 without the threat of 
trial, prosecutors might be less likely to act in a manner that 
is reasonable, fair, and just; 
(7) Because DPAs resolve matters without trials, jury 
verdicts, appellate court decisions, and without establishing 
binding judicial precedent, the agreements are not 
particularly useful in clarifying the boundaries of permissible 
legal conduct; 
(8) DPAs help explain why, in recent years, DOJ seems to be 
going against its own internal charging guidelines by shifting 
the focus of enforcement action from individuals to 
companies; and 
(9) DPAs allow federal prosecutors to shift their focus toward 
reforming corrupt corporate cultures and away from 
indicting, prosecuting, and punishing criminal transgressors. 
 
 177. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968) (“The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary 
power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against 
the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps 
overconditioned or biased response of a judge.”).  
REILLY.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:18 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
354 
The Department of Justice is the agency responsible for 
enforcing federal laws, many of which clearly define certain behaviors 
as criminal in nature. It seems beyond disingenuous for the DOJ to 
sometimes decide, based upon internally generated memos and 
policies,178 to employ DPAs and thereby address potential serious 
criminal violations as if they were less serious, civil violations.179 After 
all, the work of Congress in writing and passing federal law is 
conducted through painstaking and time-consuming processes, 
including countless hours of expert testimony, research and 
discussion, committee and floor debate, and, finally, voting.180 And 
the labels that Congress decides to use when putting forth various 
laws—“criminal” versus “civil”—matter a great deal.181 
We label matters as criminal because we, as a society, strongly 
condemn the behavior and we wish to protect people from it.182 
 
 178. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 18 (“In certain instances, it may be appropriate, 
upon consideration of the factors set forth herein, to resolve a corporate criminal case by means other 
than indictment. Non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, for example, occupy an 
important middle ground between declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a 
corporation.”); see also Memorandum from the Dep’t of Justice, Eric H. Holder, Deputy Attorney 
Gen., Bringing Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF [“Holder 
Memo”]; Memorandum from the Dep’t of Justice, Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., 
Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Jan. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003ja
n20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf [“Thompson memo”]; Memorandum from the Dep’t of 
Justice, Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs., available 
at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty_memo.pdf 
[“McNulty memo”].  
 179. Indeed, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual states that, “Since the primary function of a 
Federal prosecutor is to enforce the criminal law, he/she should not routinely or 
indiscriminately enter into non-prosecution agreements, which are, in essence, agreements not 
to enforce the law under particular conditions.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL § 9.27.620 (emphasis added). 
 180. See Barbara Sinclair, Symposium the Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in 
the Twenty-First Century: Panel I: Is Congress ‘The Broken Branch’?: Question: What’s Wrong 
with Congress? Answer: It’s a Democratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. 387, 397(“[W]e need to 
remember that what we ask of Congress is really hard; and with all its failings, it is still our 
most democratic branch.”). 
 181. See Uhlmann, supra note 7, at 1343–44 (discussing how the DOJ “prosecutes 
criminally because labels matter, and we communicate far more about our condemnation of 
wrongdoing when we call conduct criminal”). 
 182. See Irwin Schwartz, Toward Improving the Law and Policy of Corporate Criminal 
Liability and Sanctions, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99 (2014) (“We prosecute criminal cases to 
protect the public. By prosecuting, we seek to deter offenders, specifically and generally. We 
seek recompense for victims and we recognize the public demand for ‘just punishment.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
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Part of the motive in choosing to label something “criminal” rather 
than “civil” is to engender more severe public shaming, thereby 
further reinforcing law-conforming standards of behavior 
throughout society.183 While top DOJ officials suggest that 
acknowledging wrongdoing as part of a DPA agreement can, in 
some measure, be similar to acknowledging wrongdoing through a 
guilty plea,184 this Article suggests that is not the case. Indeed, one 
is left to wonder how much public shaming and overall 
accountability are taking place through the use of DPAs when a 
former federal prosecutor tells us that, “Companies are happy to 
enter into these deferred prosecution agreements because it’s 
become so commonplace now. . . . They take a bath in the press for 
a finite period of time. The stock markets don’t even seem to 
punish them.”185 While the theorists tell us that punishment “must 
match, or be equivalent to the wickedness of the offense,” that 
does not seem to be what occurs when DPAs are used.186 
In a speech entitled The Importance of Trials to the Law and 
Public Accountability, SEC Chair Mary Jo White extolls the 
virtues of trials by proclaiming, “How we [Americans] resolve 
disputes and how we decide the guilt or innocence of an accused are 
the true measure of our democracy.”187 Sadly, when the DOJ uses 
DPAs to address alleged corporate crimes, it thereby fails to 
decide the guilt or innocence of the accused, even though 
carrying out that duty has historically been a core function of 
criminal law enforcement. Using DPAs is essentially a way of 
imposing a term of probation before conviction. I believe this 
makes a mockery of the criminal justice system—something that 
 
 183. U.S. Department of Justice Soft on Corporate Crime, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, July 
2012, at 22. 
 184. Breuer, supra note 12 (“[I]n many ways, a DPA has the same punitive, deterrent, 
and rehabilitative effect as a guilty plea: when a company enters into a DPA with the 
government . . . it almost always must acknowledge wrongdoing, agree to cooperate with the 
government’s investigation, pay a fine, agree to improve its compliance program, and agree to 
face prosecution if it fails to satisfy the terms of the agreement. All of these components of 
DPAs are critical for accountability.”). 
 185. Danielle Douglas, Royal Bank of Scotland to Pay $612 Million to Resolve Libor Case, THE 
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/rbs-
to-pay-612m-to-resolve-libor-case/2013/02/06/2c0cc42c-6fd3-11e2-aa58-
243de81040ba_story.html. (emphasis added). 
 186. Hugo Adam Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601, 602 (1878). 
 187. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, 5th Annual Judge 
Thomas A. Flannery Lecture, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 14, 2013) (emphasis added). 
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cannot be fixed through reform ideas such as additional 
legislative188 or judicial189 oversight of the current system. 
DPAs provide a useful and productive tool to quickly, cheaply, 
and efficiently dispose of cases involving low-level, first-time, mostly 
juvenile offenders of misdemeanor crimes—the category of people 
and crimes for whom the tool was created in the early 1900s.190 
Clearly, DPAs were neither designed nor intended for the disposition 
of potentially serious criminal law matters involving sophisticated 
corporate entities and the white collar professionals engaged in 
running those entities. 
Federal Appeals Court Judge Harry T. Edwards told us nearly 
thirty years ago that settling matters through alternative dispute 
resolution is not always “fair and just,”191 and I believe the judge’s 
warning certainly applies to the use of DPAs in the corporate 
criminal context. Given that “the primary function of federal 
prosecutors is to enforce the criminal law,”192 and, furthermore, 
given DOJ’s admission that DPA-type agreements “are, in essence, 
agreements not to enforce the law under particular conditions,”193 it is 
somewhat astounding that the DOJ leadership has, in the last two 
decades, permitted DPAs to become such a common and routine 
manner of addressing corporate wrongdoing. 
 
 188. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is a New 
Approach Warranted?, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 605, 627–28 (2010) (discussing the 
“Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act,” legislation introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 2009 and again in 2014, requiring the Attorney General to set forth written 
guidelines concerning DPAs and NPAs). 
 189. See Anthony S. Barkow & Matthew D. Cipolla, Increased Judicial Scrutiny of 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 2013 (discussing a study wherein “a 
majority of prosecutors, company representatives, independent monitors and judges 
interviewed reported more disadvantages than advantages to increased judicial involvement in 
the DPA process . . . . Some respondents believed DPAs to be sufficiently analogous to plea 
discussions such that Rule 11 barred substantive judicial oversight. Others raised broader 
constitutional concerns, particularly related to separation of powers. They contend that the 
decision to enter into a DPA and to shape its contents are executive rather than judicial 
functions, and changes made by a judge would interfere with prosecutorial discretion”). 
 190. Xian, supra note 26, at 643 (discussing how DPAs, in their “original capacity,” were 
limited to non-serious, first-time misdemeanor charges such as marijuana possession and retail 
theft, especially if committed by a juvenile). 
 191. Harry T. Edwards, Commentary: Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or 
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 679 (1986). 
 192. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9.27.620, supra note 179. 
 193. Id. (emphasis added). 
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It is time to end this failed experiment in alternative dispute 
resolution. And in the end, if DPAs are not eradicated as a tool of 
corporate criminal law enforcement, perhaps we can at least change 
their name to something that more accurately describes the benefit 
that the vast majority of recipients obtain through their current use: 
Avoiding Prosecution Agreements (APAs). Individuals and 
companies avoid prosecution, and the rest of America pays a certain 
and costly price for that avoidance. Justice deferred for a select group 
of individuals and companies means justice denied for the rest of us. 
Some readers will surely ask, “But if Congress eliminates DPAs in 
the corporate criminal context, what will replace them?” Nothing 
need replace them. Rather, the two choices that were available to 
prosecutors before DPAs arrived on the scene—namely, prosecution  
or declination—were, and still are, more than adequate to address 
potential violations. As in every other area of criminal law, the 
defendant facing prosecution would then decide to put the 
government to its burden of proof at trial, or the defendant would 
decide to opt for a plea bargain (I imagine most defendants would 
opt for the latter, given that ninety-five percent of all federal criminal 
cases, and well over ninety percent of cases involving organizational 
defendants, are currently resolved through guilty pleas).194 Moreover, 
it is clear that the advantages currently flowing from the use of DPAs 
could also be achieved through plea bargaining, including (1) quick 
and efficient payment of restitution to victims; (2) requiring 
companies to cooperate with the government in the prosecution of 
culpable individuals within their respective organizations; (3) 
requiring companies to implement (or augment) internal ethics 
and/or compliance programs; and (4) providing guidance to other 
companies on what constitutes improper conduct, or what 
constitutes conduct that “crosses the line” in the eyes of the DOJ.195 
Of course, proponents of deferred prosecution might, at this 
point, turn to the one remaining argument favoring DPAs over plea 
bargaining: Namely, that using DPAs can avoid the collateral 
consequences that sometimes flow from conviction by trial or plea 
 
 194. See O’SULLIVAN, supra note 10.  
 195. See Statement of Gary G. Grindler, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Criminal 
Div., U. S. Dep’t of Justice, Accountability, Transparency, and Uniformity in Corporate 
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & 
Admin. Law, 111th Cong. , 5–6 (2009) (discussing the advantages that flow from the use of 
DPAs in addressing corporate criminal matters). 
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bargain, as discussed at length above. However, this Article strongly 
suggests not only that the existence and severity of collateral 
consequences have heretofore been exaggerated, but also that such 
consequences can and should be addressed by the policies, processes, 
rules, and regulations of institutions other than the DOJ, and by 
individuals other than prosecutors. In the end, the fear of and/or 
potential for collateral consequences should not have the power to 
persuade the DOJ and federal prosecutors to turn to the less fair and 
less just alternative dispute resolution vehicle of DPAs to address 
potential corporate criminal wrongdoing. 
 
 
 
